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Abstract
Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) originated to accomplish several
objectives: (1) to meet energy efficiency goals mandated by executive orders and energy
policies; (2) to improve federal government facilities using funds allocated for utility
bills; and (3) to receive repayment of expenditures through energy savings reflected in
reduced utility bills. In ESPCs, the contractor guarantees savings to the federal
government agency. 10 CFR 436 limits the time necessary for payback. However, this
regulation and others were written prior to the deregulation of utility companies. This
theory is based on the underlying premise that the contractor payback is a direct result of
the energy savings. The population of study is all of the Air Force ESPCs. The sampling
frame used will be the ESPCs and their task orders (TOs) listed in the Air Force Civil
Engineering Support Agency (AFCESA) database. The primary unit of analysis will be
the individual task order. Data will be collected from interviews, observations,
conferences, archives, and other task order related documents. Using case study
methodology, contract financial data, energy rates, contract decision memorandums,
contract clauses and statements of work, observation, open interviews, and other relevant
meetings and materials will be evaluated to determine whether deregulation has an effect
on contractor payback and what the effect entails.

IX

THE MANAGEMENT OF
ENERGY SAVINGS PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS (ESPCs)
I. Introduction
Utility prices are influenced by the cost of generated power, the availability of
transmission lines, and the ease of distribution capabilities, regulated forces, and other
factors. The Air Force, under the direction of Congress and the Department of Defense,
has adopted energy conservation efforts to combat the effects of rising utility prices.
Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) are contracts that guarantee the energy
conservation efforts will reduce the utility expenditures.
Current Air Force Regional ESPCs have a combined capacity of $1.27 Billion
which may be replaced by future ESPCs, given that the Air Force has determined ESPCs
to be the preferred method for energy conservation funding (ESPC Intro, 2000). In areas
like California where utility rates are skyrocketing and conservation measures achieve
guaranteed savings with exponential paybacks, ESPCs may be the best method of
combating the rising costs of energy. In areas such as North and South Dakota where
deregulation is not yet an issue and utility rates are stable, ESPCs may continue to be an
acceptable method to energy conservation. However, in areas like Pennsylvania and
Illinois where utility rates have a projected decline, ESPCs may not be the most effective
tool in energy conservation.
This study will explore the effects of deregulation on ESPC use. Although the
scope of this research is limited to active Air Force installations, the implications of the
research should be consistent across all of DoD and other federal installations. Research
may find ESPC use should be more actively promoted in those areas of the country where

Utility rates may skyrocket and should be terminated, modified, or never activated in
those areas of the country where utility rates are projected to decline significantly.
Utility companies had been providing Air Force installations electricity, water,
cable, and sewage without fear of competition or termination until the early 1990s when
deregulation efforts began. In the last twenty years, two issues gained importance in the
Air Force community: (1) energy conservation mandates from the Executive branch and
(2) a declining defense budget. Together, these separate issues influenced the formation
of Demand Side Management Agreements.
Demand Side Management Agreements (DSMA) were contractual vehicles which
permitted installations to simultaneously receive facility improvements and utility bill
reductions from their utility service provider. These contracts solved both the problem of
achieving conservation requirements and the problem of the budget. Through these
contracting instruments, Air Force bases had the power to improve facilities as long as
those improvements resulted in significant energy reductions and the power to reduce
utility bills. The reductions in utility bills, the results of the facility improvements, were
paid to the utility service contractor for the construction performed.
There were advantages and disadvantages to DSMAs. Conveniently, installations
were given sole source authority to contract facility improvements and energy reductions
with their regulated utility companies. On the other hand, DSMAs were limited to a tenyear estimated payback time, the time allotted for the reduced utility bill to pay for the
facility improvement. Furthermore, the contract time, the time allotted for all facility
improvements and utility bill reductions, also could not exceed ten years. Consequently,
federal acquisition authorities developed Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs)

tools. These new contracts, ESPCs, eliminated the contracting officer's authority to enter
into a sole source contract for energy savings improvements with the utility service
provider. However, ESPCs regulations permitted installations to form contracts up to 25
years with energy service companies. There were no other significant differences
between these two contracting instruments.
Background
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct of 1992) and Executive Order 13123
mandate energy efficiency goals. The Air Force has mandated that installations use
ESPCs as the preferred contract vehicle to achieving these goals. This insistence stems
from the benefits of ESPCs which include not only the reduc ed energy bills but also the
improved energy efficiency, the upgraded facilities and equipment, and the alternative
financing. ESPCs allow the Air Force to address the two issues mentioned in the
introduction, energy reduction mandates and defense financing reductions.
The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) offers an efficient overview
of the effects of Energy Savings Performance Contracting (FEMP, 2000). FEMP
summarizes ESPCs stating that they can be used to "update aging building systems,
streamline operations, and train maintenance workers to reduce operating costs" (FEMP,
2000). Whenever a facility needs to update aging equipment with new, more efficient
equipment, meet energy reduction goals, conserve fuels, reduce energy consumption, and
reduce utility bill expenditures without reducing service, FEMP recommends ESPC
usage. In its overview, FEMP directs its readers to a common sense approach useful to
the justification of these new contracting tools stating that ESPCs allow agencies to use
the savings received for future projects or other base requirements with money that was

previously wasted on inefficient energy usage. Figure 1 was adapted from their
overview.
Energy Savings Performance Contracting
Reallocates the utility bill to:
•
•
•

Pay a lower utility bill
Pay the contractor
Achieve cost savings for the government

Government
Savings

Continued
Utility
Bill

Before ESPC

During ESPC

After ESPC

(Adapted from: FEMP, 2000)
Figure 1. Energy Savings Performance Contracting
Energy service companies assume the costs of installing the new equipment,
system, or facility upgrade. In the contracting process, the contractor guarantees a fixed
amount of savings due to the energy conservation measure. The government allocates
money that would have otherwise been obligated to pay inefficient utility systems, to the
contractor in a financing arrangement similar to a mortgage; the contractor receives
interest and profit on the energy reduction measure employed. In a perfect ESPC
arrangement, the government receives more than the guaranteed savings, and in turn, the
government receives savings beyond the expenditures paid to the contractor for the
conservation measure. Hence, when the contract ends (within a period of 25 years), the

government retains all of the cost reduction benefits of the energy reduction measure
without any additional commitment to the contractor.
Due to the effect ESPCs had on the ability of each installation to achieve both
energy and financial goals, additional regulations were developed to organize these
contracting tools in a manner that would standardize agency use. According to 10 USCA
2865, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a simplified method of contracting ESPCs.
Furthermore, 10 USCA 2865 directs all agencies to implement any energy conservation
measure that has a 10-year or less payback and these consolidated measures must be
achieved within a contract lifespan limited to a 25-year window. This regulation allows
for direct negotiation with the ESPC contractors once the utility companies servicing the
installations have approved them. The utility company certifies that these contractors
have the ability to provide energy conservation services.
The regulation which implements Environmental Protection Act (EPAct) of 1992,
10 CFR 436.30, states that the contract shall guarantee an energy savings, an annual audit
to verify guarantees, interest as an allowable cost, and require payments made only from
energy funds or related operation and maintenance expenses for the infrastructure
improvements. ESPCs allow the government to take advantage of Energy Service
Company (ESCO) financing and utility company rebate and incentive programs.
Because ESPCs are paid based on guaranteed savings, ESPC training teaches contracting
officers to designate a single POC for audit, design, construction, and maintenance.
In October 1986, legislation for shared energy savings contracting began. By
February 1994, the first Air Force ESPC was awarded at Randolph AFB, and between
September and December 1998, Regional ESPCs (RESPCs) were awarded in the Air

Force with a combined contract capacity of $1.27 Billion. Six different regions covering
the United States, its territories, and Korea were established with six Indefinite Delivery,
Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) - single award contracts, one in each region. By December
1998, the first RESPC task order was completed at Travis AFB (ESPC Intro, 2000).
There are six AF ESPC Regional contracting offices (Region 1 (Tyndall AFB,
AETC), Region 2 (WPAFB, AFMC), Region 3 (Peterson, AFSPC), Region 4 (Langley,
ACC), Region 5 (Travis AFB, AMC), and Region 6 (Randolph AFB, AETC)). The Air
Force uses these RESPCs as the primary means to achieve energy mandates. In turn, the
ESPC provides a method for contracting services to design, acquire, finance, install, test,
operate, maintain, and repair an identified energy or water conservation measure (ESPC
Intro, 2000).
AFCESA teaches installations that the contractor payback language should be
specific and clear. For example, training states when the government will begin making
payments to the ESCO, specifies how the ESCOs share is to be divided, and orders
annual reconciliation to ensure guaranteed savings (ESPC Intro, 2000). This section is
crucial to this thesis, because it allows guarantee shortfalls to be treated as credits on the
next monthly invoice and perhaps extends the life of the ESPC over the 10-year simple
payback window. Additionally, this section gives the Contracting Officer discretion
regarding how this shortfall will be paid to the government if the credit is not desired.
The contracting language used could potentially allow task order payback time to exceed
the maximum number of years originally specified in the contract. In order to calculate
the guaranteed savings and payback shown in Figure 1, training states ".. .b. Payment
will be calculated as shown in the following example:

(1) ESCO estimates a savings of $140,000/year, and
(2) ESCO guarantees a savings of $120,000/year
(3) ESCO's monthly payment is determined by:
$120,000 (guaranteed savings) + 12 months = $10,000/month" (ESPC Intro, 2000). In
periods when the government receives all or more of its guaranteed savings, this payment
calculation is appropriate. During those periods when the government does not receive
the energy savings and financial gains promised from the energy conservation effort, this
payment calculation might not be sufficient; the government may need other measures or
contract clauses for savings shortfalls.
Problem Statement
ESPCs, performance contracts for energy savings, originated to accomplish
several objectives: (1) to meet energy efficiency goals mandated by executive orders and
energy policies; (2) to improve federal government facilities using funds allocated for
utility bills; and (3) to receive repayment of expenditures through energy savings
reflected in reduced utility bills (FEMP, 2000). Each year, the contract states government
savings are guaranteed, and unrealized savings will be credited back to the government.
In turn, if the installation did not receive its savings within the contract milestone, the
installation would eventually realize these savings due to the credits applied each year per
the language of the contract.
Before ESPC, installations needed to allocate MILCON funds for improvements.
After ESPC usage had been approved, Operation and Maintenance funding allocated for
utilities enabled agencies to receive facility improvements provided the energy savings
equaled or exceed the cost of expenditures. Yet, there are at least two known

uncertainties: technical risk and rate risk. The utility industry performs an expert
evaluation of the ESCO minimizing the technical risk for the government. However, the
remaining uncertainty provides the focus of this thesis effort. If deregulatio n does have
an impact on ESPC, then there may be a risk as seen in Figure 2.
lli«'h Risk ESPCs

Low Risk KSPCs

Deregulation

Prices Decrease

N/A

Without Deregulation

Prices Constant/Decrease

Prices Constant/Increase

Figure 2. The Risk of Deregulation and ESPC
In theory, deregulation decreases prices for consumers through increased
competition (Goffman, 1995:33). Successfully deregulated areas should, in theory,
experience smaller utility bills, ceteris per bus. However, with ESPC, the ESCO
guarantees that its energy conservation measure will decrease the utility bill and generate
a savings for the government, ceteris per bus. Yet, if deregulation influenced the savings
of ESPC, then the payback time may lengthen. If deregulation is decreasing utility bills,
then the energy conservation measure will take longer to achieve net return on the
investment; in other words, the ESPC government savings process slows. Furthermore,
the payback time may be extended past the regulated time permitted as payments are
credited to the government each year and not applied to the total contractor bill. If
deregulation is successful, then utility rates will decrease and the government will If the
utility rates increase, the utility expenditures increase (ceteris per bus) and the energy
conservation measure performed by the ESPC should provide high savings for the
government. In contrast, if the utility expenditures decrease, the utility expenditures

decrease (ceteris per bus) and the energy conservation measure performed by the ESPC
may provide less than the guaranteed savings for the government.
Consequently, ESPCs may be risky contracting instruments in certain regions of
the country. Already, Californian and Texas-based utility companies have filed
bankruptcy; communities affected by these and other providers are feeling the strain of
high utility rates and frequent outages. Other service companies, such as those in
Pennsylvania and Ohio, project success and estimate that standard utility bills will
decrease significantly. Yet, each deregulating state can only estimate the probability of
its program's success. The instability in the utility industry creates uncertainty on the
effects of deregulation, and these effects may have an impact on ESPCs ability to
guarantee savings, thus preventing repayment of expenditures due to the residual utility
bills and defeating objective three of ESPC.
Research Question
This thesis seeks to discover the significant factors which affect ESPCs placing
emphasis on deregulation as a potential effect during the case analysis. Additionally, due
to the differences in regions, these effects may be different in different areas of the
country. In other words, some regions are primarily rural; others are mostly urban.
There may also be differences in climate, ESPC monitoring, ESPC interest rates, and
regulated utility status that affect the savings. These assumptions raise several questions.
Does deregulation in fact affect ESPCs? What are the variables that affect ESPCs and
what are the projected effects? Is there variance between regions in the variables relevant
to ESPCs?

Methodology
This study conducts a qualitative case study analysis of ESPCs. To properly
access the current and future health of ESPCs, research provides an in-depth analysis of
five installations, each with task orders (TOs) in various phases of completion. Each
individual installation is treated as a case, and within case analysis was performed to
analyze possible factors that may compromise success while concentrating on
deregulation as a possible factor. Success is determined to be the Task Order's ability to
achieve guaranteed energy cost savings within the payback period originally specified.
Afterwards, TOs analysis compares perceived successes, failures, and issues and matches
common characteristics to identify any patterns.
Summary
This chapter offered a brief picture of the history of ESPCs. Additionally,
background information on the rationale and the regulation behind the formation of
ESPCs was provided to give a foundation to the research questions and assumptions.
Perhaps the greatest relevance to this research is its ability to address the future of energy
conservation measures and how these measures should be executed.
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II. Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter provides a literature review of energy use, Energy Savings
Performance Contract (ESPC) regulations, scenario-based planning, deregulation, and the
utility industry. When reviewing literature on energy, focus is made on the broad concept
of energy, energy savings as stated in regulation, and ESPC definition and history. After
describing ESPCs, scenario-based planning illustrates which level of uncertainty ESPCs
must plan against. In the deregulation segment, generalities and examples offer a
forecast on the impact of utility deregulation. The utility industry analysis presents a
strategic look at the industry's competitive forces.
Energy
David Rose stated that energy is not a material commodity; it is an abstract
concept invented by physical scientists in the 19th century to describe quantitatively a
wide variety of natural phenomenon (Rose, 1986:5). Nevertheless, this abstract concept
has value, and this value lies in its efficient use. Whether utilities are government owned
or privatized, energy is recognized as being a public good, tied to the public welfare.
Since energy is a part of the fabric of civilization, both the people and the society in
which they live need and use energy. Energy is 10 to 15% of the Gross National Product
of the United States and many other countries (Rose, 1986:x). Energy, this essential
resource, intertwines with nearly every personal and professional enterprise. By studying
the growth of energy, history is studied. Yet, energy is not easily analyzable or
deterministic. As a resource, its availability is not certain; its demand is not known.
Energy projections in 1970 for the energy needs of 1990 were ridiculously high.
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However, what has come to be realized about energy is critical. Its supply is limited, its
demand is growing, and its efficient use is essential.
Energy flows from a primary resource such as coal or petroleum. This resource is
extracted and transported to a central conversion facility such as an electric power plant
or an oil refinery. Through avenues such as electric power lines and gas pipelines, the
energy goes through the stage of transmission and distribution to be used by the end
customer (Rose, 1986:7).
As Rose explains, energy is obtained from a variety of resources to provide the
light, heat, and power needs of a society. The principal fossil fuels - petroleum, coal,
natural gas, and lignite - are nonrenewable resources; supply is therefore finite. Non-fuel
energy sources- radioactive elements, wastes, water, wind, geothermal, biomass, and
solar heat - presently do not supply much of society's demands. However, these non-fuel
resources may become of greater importance as conservation efforts fail to address the
realities of limited fossil fuel supply (Parker, 198 l:p).
United States energy consumption has risen but at different rates for different
periods and has decreased somewhat in certain fuel segments. In 1920, wood was the
largest supply of fuel, but this resource declined to nearly zero by 1980. Similarly, coal
reached its peak in 1910 and began its own decline. However, rather than coal's resource
use declining to zero, coal consumption maintained a steady 20 percent thereafter,
suffering only minor increases and decreases in usage rates. On the other hand,
consumption of petroleum and natural gas has continued to increase since 1948. Natural
gas had a period of reduced consumption in the mid-1970's but began to increase again.
Across periods, the industrial segment has been the largest major economic sector in

12

energy consumption with 35 to 40 percent consumption rates. Residential is the second
largest major economic sector with 17 to 21 percent consumption rates, and commercial
follows third with 15 to 17 percent rates. Automotive and other transportation are the
remaining major economic sectors with 10 to 15 percent consumption rates each.
Overall, energy consumption increased 3.5 percent each year up until 1973. After the
energy crisis scare, consumption began to increase at less than one percent each year
thereafter. In fact, the industrial sector experienced decreased consumption rates during
periods in the late 1970s and in the mid 1980s. In sum, energy conservation has created a
push towards energy efficiency, and this movement has been on a consistent upswing
(Parker, 1981). Consumption rates are illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Energy Consumption by Source
1860-2000
(Quadrillion BTU)
(Dept of Energy html)
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Energy Savings Regulations
Conservation of energy saves the supply of the natural resource and the supply of
the societal pocketbook. Like the fuel, the availability of funds is limited. Although
money may be generated, its value is made more precious by restricting its supply. The
United States has mandated many energy reduction goals in an effort to conserve both
energy and financial resources. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct of 1992) amends
such previous acts such as the Energy Conservation and Production Act and the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. This act, also known as Public Law 102-486 is
provided to promote improved energy efficiency. There are certain terms defined in this
law that will be used in this research. In Title I, Energy Efficiency, the term "Federal
Building Energy Standards" means that "energy consumption objectives (are) to be met
without specification of the methods, materials, or equipment to be employed in
achieving those objectives, but including statements of the requirements, criteria, and
evaluation methods to be used" (EPAct, 1992: Title I). This statement made in Subtitle
A, Buildings, in Section 101, Building Energy Efficiency Standards, may be rephrased to
state that Congress has determined it not necessary to state the methods used to conserve
energy. Instead, Congress mandates only documentation of the requirements and
solutions. However, Subtitle F, Federal Agency Energy Management, had determined it
necessary to state the methods that will be used to conserve energy. Section 152, Federal
Energy Management Amendments, Energy Management Requirement for Federal
Agencies, states that "not later than January 1, 2005, each agency shall to the maximum
extent practicable install in Federal buildings owned by the United States all energy and
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water conservation measures with payback periods less than 10 years, as determined by
using methods and procedures developed pursuant to section 544" (EPAct, 1992: Title I).
This section goes on further to state that The Secretary, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Administrator of General Services shall identify which projects will allow payback
periods in order to take maximum advantage of ESPCs. ESPCs are contracts mandated
under Title VIII of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. This mandate is to promote financing
to reduce the direct costs to the Government while providing investment into creating
efficient utilities.
The Title VIII specified is the law that Congress advises the Secretary of Defense
to utilize. In turn, although Congress does not state the methods to be used in energy
conservation efforts, Congress does advise the Secretary, Secretary of Defense, and the
Administrator of General Services to use the contracts specified by Title VIII. Title VIII,
Energy Savings Performance Contracts, advises these contract vehicles to promote cost
effective technologies. This program is to be used to "increase building energy
efficiency, while maintaining affordability, by the year 2005" (EPAct, 1992: Title XX).
Before discussing ESPCs, other aspects in the EPAct of 1992 need to be
addressed. In regulated states, EPAct of 1992 determined that allowable rates charged by
regulated utilities reflect profitable energy conservation efforts and other demand
management measures. Section 115 defines "demand side management" as energy
conservation, energy efficiency, and load management techniques. Recall from Chapter
One in this thesis that Demand Side Management Agreements were the preferred contract
vehicles prior to the implementation of ESPCs. The term ESPC is expanded to include
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energy efficient products contracted in regulated and non-regulated states with
independent contractors working with utility companies. The primary differences
between the two contract vehicles are the payback periods allowed and the contractor
employed. In Demand Side Management Agreements, a federal facility contracted
directly with the utility company with a payback period limited to 10 years. In ESPCs,
federal procurement offices contract with independent contractors to improve energy
efficiency. These independent contractors are separate corporations from the utility
companies. The overall contract payback period, using a combination of all payback
projects, may reach up to 25 years with each individual conservation effort still limited
by the original 10-year payback stipulation.
Section 111 of the EPAct of 1992 addresses regulated utilities and requires
regulators to link utility revenues to utility effectiveness. This section requires that the
rates are a direct reflection of implementing cost-effective energy conservation programs.
This same section goes on further to state that the regulated utility performance shall not
be affected by reductions in retail sales volume. In sum, regulated rates and regulated
performance are mandated to be results of energy efficient, cost reducing, demand
management programs. Deregulated utility companies will be discussed in a later
section.
The EPAct of 1992 provided guidance for all federal, state, and local agencies; 10
U.S.C. 2865, Energy Savings at Military Installations, provides guidance for the
Department of Defense (DoD) for achieving energy performance goals. In addition to a
restatement of EPAct of 1992 guidance, this regulation provides for the use of the
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Regional ESPC vehicles which allow installations to use existing contracts in an effort to
simplify and accelerate the use of ESPCs. Also, this regulation specifies the manner in
which DoD funds will be apportioned. Furthermore, 10 U.S.C. 2865 Part B, Use of
Energy Cost Savings, states that one-third of these savings shall remain available for
obligation of additional energy conservation measures. Additionally, one-third shall
remain available for improvements to existing military family housing units, minor
quality of life construction projects, and any morale, welfare, or recreation facility or
service.
Energy Savings Performance Contracts
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 authorized and recommended ESPCs use to the
maximum extent possible. ESPC usage allows Federal funds to be used elsewhere;
ESPCs are contract vehicles which allow third party financing. The energy service
company assumes the capital cost of the energy conservation efforts. The company
guarantees a fixed amount of energy cost savings throughout the life of the contract and
receives its payment directly from those savings. Through ESPCs, agencies, specifically
Air Force installations, achieve three benefits. First, the EPAct of 1992 mandated a 35
percent reduction in energy consumption (compared with energy levels in 1985) in all
federal buildings by 2010 (FEMP, 2000). ESPC conservation projects assist the federal
agencies in achieving this requirement. Second, the Air Force has limited funding on
energy conservation efforts; thus, ESPC contractors provide the up-front capital costs.
Lastly, the energy service company forecasts energy cost savings and guarantees a
smaller portion of these forecasted savings. Through ESPCs, the company receives
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payment directly from the savings, but the government receives the remainder of these
savings for itself.
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) provides guidelines for ESPC
contracting. In 10 CFR 436, an annual energy audit is required. This audit must include
a verification of the achievement of energy cost savings and energy unit savings
guaranteed resulting from the ESPC. This audit can also be utilized as a determination of
whether an adjustment to the energy baseline is necessary. An adjustment to the baseline
is justified if the conditions, which may affect the cost savings, were beyond the
contractor's control. For example, an adjustment may be justified if the installation
added a new wing, which increased the energy usage of each facility due to the additional
personnel and mission requirements. This audit is a survey that includes a detailed
analysis of energy cost savings and energy unit savings potential, building conditions,
energy consuming equipment, and hours of use for the purposes of confirming the
original contractor proposals in the technical and price categories, which were based on a
preliminary energy survey. This audit is generally performed by contractor personnel
and verified by Base Civil Engineers.
There are several terms defined by 10 CFR 436 that will be used in this research
effort. Specifically, 10 CFR 436 defines ESPCs as "contracts which provide for the
performance of services for the design, acquisition, installation, testing, operation, and,
where appropriate, maintenance and repair of an identified energy conservation measure
or series of measures at one or more locations." Other terms are also defined; 10 CFR
436 defines the energy baseline as the amount of energy that would be consumed

annually without implementation of energy conservation measures. This baseline uses
historical metered data, engineering calculations, submetering of buildings, load
simulations models, statistical regression, or a combination of methods. Additionally, 10
CFR 436 defines energy conservation measures as any measure which improves energy
efficiency. These measures are lifecycle cost effective and may involve energy
conservation, cogeneration facilities, renewable energy sources, improvements in
operation and maintenance efficiencies, or retrofit activities. Energy cost savings are
reductions in energy costs and related operation and maintenance expenses from the base
cost established in the contract.
Other than defined terms, 10 CFR 436 also provides for a two-step process which
allows agencies to obtain proposals initially on estimated energy savings with contract
award conditioned on confirmation through a detailed energy survey. This initial
proposal may detail life cycle cost energy conservation measures. The second stage is an
award of the initial proposal in its entire, partial, or revised form. The final ESPCs are
firm fixed price contracts that may be entered for a period not to exceed 25 years. There
are mandatory requirements that must be included in each ESPC. These include the
annual energy audit, the guarantee of energy cost savings, but also an establishment of
payment schedules reflecting this guarantee and provisions for third party financing.
Significant to this research effort are the conditions for payment spelled out in the
regulation. Section 436.36 of the CFR states that any amount paid by a Federal agency
pursuant to any ESPC may be paid only from funds appropriated for utility bill expenses
and operation and maintenance expenses that would have been incurred had the ESPC
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not existed. The contractor may not obtain payment unless savings are realized.
However, the regulation states that the amount of funds that a Federal agency would have
paid prior to ESPCs is equal to the energy baseline in the ESPC itself and any related
operations and maintenance cost prior to the ESPC (and adjusted for price indices).
Just as 10 CFR 436 provides general guidance for ESPCs, AFCESA offers Air
Force bases specific guidance on how to implement a regional ESPC task order.
The Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA) has assisted each of six lead
bases to award a RESPC. These six contracts afford most Air Force activities access to an Air
Force RESPC. AFCESA is the gatekeeper for bases wanting to participate in a RESPC. The lead
base contracting office will delegate ordering authority to other contracting offices within their
region after AFCESA has approved the base's participation. Following the procedures below is
required to obtain and keep the authority to use an Air Force RESPC. These procedures are
applicable for initial acceptance into a RESPC and the issuance of every task order under that
ESPC. NOTE: The agreement between RESPC lead bases and AFCESA/CESM is that AFCESA
will handle as much of the interface/questions with other installations as possible. This is to
reduce the overhead/workload on the lead base. (Implementation Procedures: November 1998)

When an installation generates interest to perform an Energy Savings Performance
Project, the installation Contracting Officer forwards a memorandum, after coordinating
with base civil engineering, to HQ AFCESA/CES stating their interest in using an
RESPC. After this memorandum is received HQ AFCESA/CES schedules and conducts
training for the installation's contracting and engineering personnel. After training, the
Regional Contracting Officer (RCO) receives notification from AFCESA that training
has been received and the requesting installation is approved to participate in an RESPC.
At that time, the RCO sends a memorandum to the installation's applicable contracting
officer delegating ordering authority with a copy of the RESPC and procedures. Once
this is done, the installation Contracting Officer invites the Energy Service Company
(ESCO) to a pre-performance meeting to discuss the installation's requirements. After
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this meeting, the contracting officer may direct the ESCO to perform a Phase I Preliminary Site Survey. During this entire process, AFCESA, and not the RCO, is
responsible for answering all questions and assuring that the installation-contracting
officer has maintained compliance. Once the ESCO provides the Phase I report, the base
civil engineers review and approve with the assistance of AFCESA if desired, and the
base-contracting officer informs the RCO and AFCESA of the potential project dollar
amount and the intent to proceed to Phase II - Facility Energy Audit and Economic
Analysis. The RCO then determines if there is adequate headroom on the RESPC, and
AFCESA issues a tracking number for the installation's task order. If headroom exists
and the tracking number is issued, the installation's contracting officer, then directs the
ESCO in writing to perform Phase II. Once again, the base civil engineers must review
and approve the Phase II report. The contracting officer must notify the RCO and
AFCESA if the original Phase I dollar amounts have been exceeded and must submit a
memorandum for Congressional Notification if the task order exceeds $750 thousand.
Once notification is complete, the contracting officer may issue the task order for Phase
II to the ESCO (Implementation Procedures: November 1998). Overall, it is AFCESA
who provides training, oversight, and guidance to Air Force installations on ESPCs.
The Federal Energy Management Program performed a case study on the 1992
ESPC used to upgrade the infrastructure in the Statute of Liberty monument (FEMP,
2000). The energy conservation measures included energy efficient lighting, variable
speed drives, and energy management control systems. Other than the lighting, the
conservation measures are computer controlled at a power plant. Additionally, the
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contractor is responsible for equipment maintenance during the 15-year life of the
contract. These benefits were realized without capital costs incurred by the Department
of Energy (DOE), the project initiator. The lessons learned from this project helped other
agencies reform their individual ESPC guidelines. For instance, the DOE discovered that
the unique requirements of an ESPC and the limited technical and contracting staff
resulted in a prolonged implementation period. They also discovered a necessity to
negotiate any considerations prior to contract award to ensure facility needs are met. A
significant lesson was that of restricted scope, this particular ESPC made no
improvements to the exterior lighting of the monument. Although the scope of this
project was limited and the initiator DOE, this case represents an example of the
historical use of ESPCs (FEMP, 2000).
Scenario-Based Planning
Courtney et al. (1997) suggest that there are four levels of uncertainty that
continues to exist even after a professional strategic analysis has been performed
(Courtney, 1997:82). These uncertainties, residual uncertainties, exist; because once the
analysis of a market has been conducted, certain unknowns remain. For example, when
evaluating the utility industry for ESPCs, there remains uncertainty of which states may
adopt deregulation and when it would be adopted. There also remains uncertainty in the
utility market for future utility prices across the country. However, it is the level of
uncertainty that should be of consequence to managers and decision makers.
Courtney et al. (1997) suggest that at Level One: A Clear Enough Future the
uncertainty is insignificant and predictions are precise (Courtney, 1997:82). For
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example, if an established trucking company wished to predict the affect of purchasing a
new truck, the uncertainty of the next quarter earnings, the sale of the old truck, and the
impact on net profit are predictions that can be made with enough certainty to give
trucking managers a clear vision of the impact. Entering into ESPCs cannot be placed
into such a category of minor uncertainties. Level one uncertainty implies that the
predictions are precise. There were too many variables that impacted these ESPC
contracts. ESPCs were more complex; these were a new type of contracting instrument
affecting the financial community, the contracting community, the civil engineers, the
utility companies, and an energy contractor. All of those entities had to work together to
create a new arrangement in an environment affected by fluctuating utility prices, a need
for training, and a need for trust or guarantees between the contractor and the government
for savings and payback. Yet, Level Two: Alternative Future Uncertainties, in which
there are pending conditions that affect the outcomes, do not fit the ESPC situation as
well (Courtney, 1997:83). Although an example of a Level Two uncertainty would be a
decision maker faced with a decision before legislation was passed, ESPCs did not fit this
category. ESPCs had too many variables and uncertainties as stated previously to be a
potential candidate for Level Two uncertainties.
There may be some debate as to whether ESPCs are best described as Level
Three: A Range ofFutures or Level Four: True Ambiguity uncertainty (Courtney,
1997:83-84). In Level Three uncertainties, there are no distinct alternatives; in other
words, there is a range of possible outcomes. When American firms first began entering
the South American market, they were faced with Level Three uncertainties - market
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share gain, government cooperation, political unrest, etc. In Level Four uncertainties, it
is impossible to identify all of the variables affecting the environment. Furthermore, the
variables identified have possibilities in which it is impossible to predict the range. One
could argue that ESPCs fall into Level Four ambiguity. The uncertainties were many and
ranged across the five constructs studied in this thesis effort: deregulation, utility prices,
savings, contract management, and contractor performance; these constructs are
described in the methodology section of this thesis. An example of uncertainty within the
constructs includes:
Would operational contracting offices be able to understand, execute, and control a new
type of contracting instrument? Contract Management
Would operational civil engineering squadrons be equipped to read, write, measure,
monitor, and inspect the ESPC contracts and results? Contract Management
Will the ESPC classroom training be sufficient for operational bases to understand these
new instruments? Contract Management
How will deregulation affect the payback of ESPCs? Deregulation Will it accelerate or
slow contractor payback? How will this affect interest rates? Savings
How will operational bases be equipped to handle ESPC contractors with performance
problems or other issues? Contract Management/Contractor Performance How will the
Termination Schedule affect contract management decisions? Contract
Management/Contractor Performance
•

•

Is the measuring and verification (M&V) significant to ensure government savings?
Savings Including M&V on un-metered facilities? Savings How does the government
ensure a for-profit business that submits the annual M&V report is promoting the
government's not-for-profit best interest? Contractor Performance
Will the utility prices actually decrease as a result of deregulation within the 20 -year
payback window? Utility Prices/Deregulation

If ESPCs fit into Level Four or Level Three uncertainty, the Air Force can adapt
the shaping strategy for new ESPCS and new contracting instruments (Courtney,
1997:88). Courtney et al. (1997) suggest that there are three strategies: shaping,
adapting, and reserving the right to play. In many ways, the Air Force actively executes
the shaping strategy currently using its litigation team to speak to state legislation and
federal commission on utility issues. Because of Federal Acquisition Regulation, the Air
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Force may not use the shaping strategy to influence contractors in many ways. Yet,
contractors may still be shaped in a manner to allow more flexibility such that task orders
can be tracked and adapted as conditions changed. At present, although these contracts
were a new type of instrument, they are still standard rigid contract documents.
Moreover, the government's flexibility of termination is limited in the high cost of the
termination schedule. Yet, with a fully executed shaping strategy, the Air Force attempts
to shape the legislation, the base operational environment, and the contractor quality.
The only alternative strategy Courtney et al. (1997) suggests at these two levels is
reserving the right to play - a risky strategy because of the loss of possible returns of
taking the gamble (Courtney, 1997:88).
Deregulation
Although ESPCs are a relatively new vehicle employed to reduce energy and
budgetary resources, deregulation is a concept with history in different industries and at
different levels. Yet, a trend can be found in the study of deregulation; deregulation and
regulation are cyclical as seen in Figure
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effect as legislation releases the industry to promote competition in an effort to promote
productivity, increase competition and decrease costs. However, regulation becomes a
reality again as the protection for the consumer must be balanced with free market
competition.
The utility industry is beginning its first phase of deregulation, but industries such
as banking, insurance, mass transit, and airlines have experienced a life cycle portrayed
by a stage of growth and maturity. Once this stage is complete, governments begin to
implement measures to limit consumer risk and decrease societal costs. However, these
regulations tend to become too stringent, and restricted competition coupled with
inefficient operation results. In turn, the third stage is one of deregulation, an economic
freedom for the industry actors to exercise greater control over operations and for others
to enter and to exit the market with greater ease. This stage opens the market for
increased competition and the possibility of decreased prices for the consumer. Yet, this
freedom does not necessarily result in the success predicted by analysts. Hence,
regulations are implemented once more to protect the consumers and to promote ideal
business practices.
Deregulation: Defined, Success, and Failure
Deregulation can be defined as the restructuring of an industry to promote
competition and reduce prices (Goffman, 1995:33). In regards to the utility industry,
deregulation implies that consumers may choose energy suppliers (Jarman, 2001). "That
idea works in favor of customers, as long as there is a surplus of energy and suppliers
drive their prices down to compete for customers (Jarman, 2001)." In deregulation,
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legis lation becomes less restrictive over individual business practices allowing businesses
a greater ability to control costs and generate revenue. A deregulated market creates a
policy advocating competition. If successful, competition increases, prices decrease, and
consumers benefit from the legislative reform. Deregulation may be determined
unsuccessful when legislation determines the need for re-regulation or when prices
increase instead of decrease as a result of new competition initiatives. This section looks
at the history of deregulation in the financial, mass transit, and airline industries and
compares their histories to potential future of the utility industry deregulation.
Financial Industries
The banking and insurance industries are examples of this cycle of regulation,
deregulation, and re-regulation. The United States financial service industry experienced
increased government regulation in the 1930s (Gart, 1994:8). Until the late 1970s,
regulations became stricter and more numerous (Gart, 1994:81). It was not until the
1980s and early 1990 that deregulation removed prior stringent requirements set forth by
Congress (Gart, 1994, 81). Shortly after this period, some in Congress thought that
additional powers given to these industries would create additional risks and additional
ways to lose money (Klein, 1995, 2). In fact, new regulations were enacted after
discussion on numerous banking institution failures.
"The stock market crash of 1929, thousands of bank failures, and the ensuing
depression brought cries of recrimination from elected officials and government
appointees and feelings of betrayal from the public" (Gart, 1994, 31). Although it was
never established that the bank failures were a consequence of underwriting or ownership

27

of securities, public perceptions were strong enough to obtain government reform.
Because the public perceived the bank failures to be a result of "over banking",
excessively lax chartering policy, chartering practice became a significant part of the
reform. Federal and state agencies regulated bank market entry, geographical location
and product lines, deposit insurance and bank balance sheets, and service prices such as
rate ceilings on bank deposits. From 1960 to 1975, additional regulations were made to
promote social responsibility and consumer protection. These regulations are often
classified as economic regulations, safety regulation, consumer information, and
protection regulation (Gart, 1994:32).
These regulations, although later deemed outmoded, prevented many future bank
failures. "The absence of old-fashioned banking panics in the post-World war II period
was a great achievement; it has probably contributed more to the general welfare than
most of the widely touted "welfare programs" (Gart, 1994:55). Yet, most of the bank
runs prior to 1934 were geographically contained and limited to a small number of banks.
Between 1865 and 1933, depositor's losses averaged only .78 percent of total deposits
during crisis years for bank failures. The primary reason for this small average loss is
due to the maintenance of high capital levels by banks. This capital acted as a buffer
against high loan and security losses; fewer banks failed. The two worst years for bank
failures, 1988 and 1989, experienced losses of approximately .25 percent - in percentage
terms, only one-third of the losses experienced during the dozen crisis years between
1865 and 1933. By contrast, during the period of the Great Depression, 1930 - 1933, 20
percent of the deposits were lost at failed banks (Gart, 1994:55). Even though bank runs
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are rare and infrequent, their effects on the local and national economy can be devastating
in the large costs results to the U.S. economy.
Before 1865, Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa required state chartered banks to guarantee
each other's liabilities. This promoted monitoring and control of banks by other banks
and prevented any losses to consumers, because individual banks ensured that other
banks were managed properly. While this system was in practice, these three states
experienced only a few bank failures and no lost deposits; during the same period, other
states experienced failures and losses that were common. This system illustrates a
feasible method in regulating an industry through peer monitoring and control rather than
government intervention (Gart, 1994:56). However, the government has consistently
been the police for reform whether this reform is federal, state, or private. As Klein
notes, "regulation is instituted to correct a market failure, the nature of that failure will
influence the form of the governmental response" or the amount of legislation, reregulation (Klein, 1995:9).
Congress believed that increased deregulation for mainframe banks could lead
banks to repeat the Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis in the 1980s. On the other hand,
deregulations would enable banks to obtain additional powers for capital generation and
consequent buffers for bailouts (Gart, 1994:97). Yet, the debate moves back and forth
with sound arguments on both sides. Robert Litan of the Brookings Institute believed
legislation would strengthen banks over time. New law could force regulators to work
quickly in fixing the problem of undercapitalized banks. Banks could be closed when
their capital falls below 2 percent of assets rather than waiting until the bank fails.
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Government's slow reactions to bad bank situations could be prevented through
regulation requiring suspended dividend payments and management changes as a bank's
capital declines. However, Leonora Cross, Office of Comptroller of Currency (OCC)
official, uses BankAmerica as an example of the potential harmful nature of regulation.
She states that if tougher standards had been in place when Bank America experienced
problems in the mid-1980s, BankAmerica would have experienced a bank failure. Yet,
BankAmerica is now one of the best run and most profitable banks in the U. S. economy
(Gart, 1994:99).
The same controversy lies within the insurance industry. Most agree that
insurance is an industry that affects the public interest and that government supervision
should protect the public with the least interference to corporate operations. A May 1991
General Accounting Office (GAO) study found that state officials are not doing a proper
job policing the insurance industry (GAO, 1991). Consequently, choices have been
discussed - federal regulation or national standards enforced by state regulators. The
GAO favored national standards. Alan Gart warns insurance regulators not to repeat the
S&L fiasco. He states that lessons should be learned from the thrift crisis and regulatory
forbearance, which raised the cost of resolving the S&L crisis and which should not be
duplicated in the insurance industry (Gart, 1994:190). On one hand, insurance companies
are more solvent than the S&Ls and banks. On the other, insurance companies are
making the same bad investments that the other financial institutions had made and are
experiencing serious problems (Klein, 1995:6-7). In sum, the financial industry needs
both more deregulation and re-regulation. There is a need for deregulation to allow
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nationwide banking and the intermingling of commercial banking to increase capital.
There is also a need for re-regulation for higher risk-based premiums, higher loan-tovalue ratios in real estate lending, reduced maximum lending limits, and uniform safer
investment guidelines (Gart, 1994:385).
The banking industry directly affects the financial resources of the nation's
economy just as the utility industry directly affects the energy supply. The similarities
between these two industries are numerous. Both industries deal with critical resources,
which directly affect the economic well being of the society. Both need some monitoring
and control to make efficient use of their reserves. Both need freedom in order to
generate the capital necessary. The banking industry needs capital as a buffer, but so
does the utility industry, which needs capital both as a buffer during economic losses and
for investment in energy conservation and load management measures. However,
deregulation created many risks for the consumers; in turn, new regulations were
necessary in order to protect consumers while still allowing firms the ability to generate
capital and while still allowing the industry as a whole the ability to promote competition.
Mass Transit Industry
Mark Alan Hughes argues for deregulation of the mass transit agencies. Stating
that deregulation removes constraints on innovation and efficiency, Hughes criticizes
public intolerance and media influence on risk-avoidance leadership, which reduces
experimentation and creative management developments. The culture of coping versus
innovating is prevalent in government agencies, which are constantly under the public's
watchful eye. Consequently, Hughes proposes the removal of legislation created by state
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and federal agencies such as the Federal Transit Authority, the Department of
Transportation, Interstate Commerce Commission, Office of Management and Budget,
and the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (Dilulio, 1994:236-247).
Transportation policy developed with the increased use of the automobile and the
massive investment in road after World War II (Dilulio, 1994:239). Regulation of the
transportation industry began with the adoption of the Federal Defense Highway Act of
1954. Just as in the banking industry, federal involvement began in reaction to a crisis.
After the interstate highway system grew in popularity, passenger rail systems became
regarded as archaic. The private industry was on the decline. In fact, regulation in 1958
made it easier for railroads to eliminate much of their passenger service. The day that the
1958 regulation was signed, railroads like New York Central Railroad posted notices
announcing plans to discontinue service. In thirty days, west shore commuters had to
find other ways to get to New York. "Mass transit use declined precipitously from 17.2
billion passengers in 1950 to 11.5 billion in 1955 to 9.3 billion in 1960, and the industry
faced collapse" (Dilulio, 1994:240). Although Hughes thought that increased
competition in the mass transit industry did not result as a product of deregulation thus
the restructuring incentive was not a success, Roderick Kaps believed otherwise (Kaps,
1997:106-119). Although Kaps concedes that U.S. passenger rail travel has decreased
significantly, Kaps' analysis of the United States transportation industry illustrated the
following figures for this industry:
"Overall, deregulation has strengthened the US industry. Despite price erosion, freight
revenue has increased by 19 percent since 1980, and the industry's return on investment, including
infrastructure, rose from 4.2 percent in 1980 to 7 percent in 1995 (although this was still not
enough to cover its cost of capital of 11.7 percent). Most important, rail managed to keep its
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market share at 38 percent—more than double the share of European railroads (Kaps, 1997:106119)."

Although the success or failure of rail industry may be in question, a failed mass
transit industry is not as devastating as a failed banking or energy industry. However, as
President Kennedy stated, urban growth needs a proper balance of private vehicles and
modern mass transport (Dilulio, 1994:240); in turn, this key resource, urban
transportation, required government intervention to ensure its survival; legislation
implemented re-regulation. By the 1960s, the Department of Transportation moved the
Urban Transportation Administration into the hands of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. However, in the 1980 era of deregulation, President Reagan
proposed an end to transit operating subsidies and implemented many deregulation
initiatives in the mass transit industry once again. The reality was that public transit
support was expensive, productivity was decreasing, and forecasted transit achievements
had not been realized. Transit had not controlled pollution, rejuvenated downtowns, nor
increased safety. Under political control, transit management was ineffective and
inefficient. Yet, in the 1990s, new regulation, not deregulation as started by the Reagan
Administration, was implemented to present guidelines to manage the transit agencies
more effectively. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act was a 300-page
document micromanaging the mass transit authority. The law contained exact
requirements, to be enacted in addition to previous legislations, which allowed labor
unions to retain power, required public hearings for all fare changes, required extensive
data collection, mandated "buy America" provisions, and prohibited supplemental
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revenues through charter services. In addition to these federal regulations, mass transit
agencies still must suffer through state and local regulations. These regulations impinge
effective management through such mandates like significant paperwork for small
projects (Dilulio, 1994:244). Demonstrating the ineffectiveness of regulation, Volker
and Winter remarked on public servants, commenting, "Not even the most public-spirited
government workers can succeed if they are hemmed on all sides by rules, regulations,
and procedures that make it virtually impossible to perform well. The most talented,
dedicated, well-compensated, well-trained, and well-led civil servants cannot serve the
public well if they are subject to perverse personnel practices that punish innovation,
promote mediocrity, and proscribe flexibility" (Dilulio, 1994:xv).
The cyclical re-regulation and deregulation of the mass transit industry history
illustrates the beginning picture of the utility industry regulation legislation. In the
beginning stages of the deregulating the utility industry, there are already parallels that
can be seen between these two industries. States that have implemented electric utility
deregulation such as California soon began instituting regulations to mandate the
procedures utility companies should follow to purchase power and to calculate utility
prices for consumers. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) also
promised to institute price controls on large utility companies (SITREP, Dec 5 2001).
These utility re-regulations limit the firm's ability to control costs and generate revenue,
thus questioning the success of deregulation as the success of mass transit's deregulation
re-regulations have been questioned.
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Airline Industry
"Sixty-two years ago, the U.S. airline industry, by most definitions, was a classic
public utility. The services provided by airlines were considered essential, and the
necessary capital investment was high in relation to revenues (Costello, 2000)." Like the
utility industry, airlines appeared to be a natural oligopoly if not a natural monopoly,
because of this belief, Costello states, regulation was thought to protect the public interest
(Costello, 2000).
The mass transit situation illustrated the need for initial federal involvement and
an example of how this involvement became a bureaucratic nightmare. Airline
deregulation illustrates how forecasted benefits of deregulation can be misstated and
inaccurate. American persons over 30 years of age are aware that there has been an
increasing availability to travel to more markets and at lower costs. From that
perspective, the airline industry has proven to be an exc ellent example of deregulation.
Yet, the purpose of deregulating the airline industry was to promote complete economic
freedom in hopes of achieving a strongly competitive environment; deregulation efforts
sought to achieve lower fares through increased competition (Williams, 1993:9). The
result of deregulation was a much more efficient industry charging lower rates to
consumers; on average, fares are 15 percent lower than they could have been if
deregulation had not been implemented (Williams, 1993:59). Government intervention
may still be needed. The successful result of efficiency and lower price may be
temporary. Forecasters promoting deregulation theorized that the airline industry could
produce a sustainable competitive environment through the theory of contestable markets

35

(Costello, 2000). This theory suggested that market competition existed within the actual
market and also with the potential level of firms 'waiting in the wings'. The theory
believed that if there was a perfect competitive environment, one in which firms could
enter and exit freely, then firms would be forced to price competitively despite the degree
of market concentration. Supporting the use of this theory, economists concluded that the
airline markets were not natural monopolies. Hence, entry barriers would be low. After
thirteen years of deregulation, it became obvious that entry barriers were actually quite
high. A few major airlines were able to prevent new start-ups from gaining market share
until the smaller companies became bankrupt or gave up; finally, the number of airline
companies has decreased to a strong few (Williams, 1993:59). "As this phase draws to a
conclusion there is a strong possibility that the surviving mega carriers will increasingly
acknowledge the futility of further competitive rivalry, with the result that the choice that
consumers will be presented with will be extremely limited. That one still may have a
choice to make is not at issue, what is in question is how significant this may actually be"
(Williams, 1993:145).
Just as forecasters projected for the airline industry, Stern states that utility
competition will make the utility industry more efficient while at the same time giving
customers more choices, more options, and lower prices (Stern, 1998: 32). Yet, when
Commonwealth Edison Co. deregulated and prices soared more than 100 times the
regular price for eight hours, there was an immediate push for re-regulation of electricity
prices to place caps on prices during supply-demand imbalance. Furthermore, retail
consumers had no choice in their local utility provider. De Ann Weimer agrees with
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Stern stating that volatile prices are expected in markets just opening to competition
(Weimer, 1998:33). However, this did not happen in the telephone industry. After
AT&T was deregulated, long distance prices decreased, but local service is relatively
more expensive than what would have been had deregulation not been enacted. "There
are pundits in the US who suggest the optimum size of a distribution company is in the
millions of customers, not the tens of thousands, to operate in the most efficient
manner.. .deregulation will not bring enough opportunities to offer new services"
(McClearn, 2001:53). There are utility companies that may suffer the same crisis of the
bank failures; the blackouts and energy rate hikes in California may not be unique events
relevant only to the state but may be pre-warnings of the unforeseen impacts of
deregulating an industry despite prior analysis and forecasting. Additionally, utility
consumers may discover that the utility industry becomes re-regulated as both the
financial industry mass transit industry became. Moreover, the utility industry, like the
airline industry, may present the consumer with limited choices.
Utility Industry: Players and Deregulation
Mike Santoro, P.E., from AFCESA's Utility Team has been studying the utility
environment with mixed reviews (Santoro, Sept 2001). He stated that previous gas
deregulation helped the Air Force save $6 to $8 million in costs each year since 1986
from well and transport delivery. However, new legislation permitting electricity
deregulation appears to have mixed results in its ability to bring the price of electricity
down through competition.
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Electric deregulation permits states to deregulate the generation portion of their
electric utilities. Across the nation, several states have chosen to implement deregulation
in various methods, and some have chosen to remain regulated for a period of time. At
this time, Santoro points out that the New England states is the only region that is having
success with deregulation; even still, the rates have only lowered as a result of
deregulation by 1 to 2% (Santoro, Sept 2001). Although California signed legislated
deregulation in 1996 and implemented its procedures in 1998, lowered utility rates may
not be realized until the year 2004. When that happens and California finally irons out
problems discovered during deregulation, then the rest of the regulated states may feel
more comfortable implementing deregulation (Santoro, Sept 2001). "As California goes,
so goes the rest of the country." (Klein, 2001:18) Yet, the results from Texas will scare a
lot of state legislators. Texas is an isolated state with its own grid. "Texas is an island,
so competition should have worked." (Santoro, Sept 2001). Texas has a balanced system
with excess generation - supply is greater than demand. Deregulation in Texas had state
backing. Rates should have decreased, but they did not, making AFCESA fear that
supply and demand does not drive the competitive market (Santoro, Sept 2001).
So what drives the competitive market? Michael E. Porter states that there are
five forces of competition: rivalry among existing firms, threat of new entrants, threat of
substitute products or services, bargaining power of suppliers, and bargaining power of
buyers (Porter, 1980:4). Porter's five forces model of competition goes beyond a supply
and demand analysis. It analyzes how companies compete with each other, how strong
the buyers or suppliers are in the industry, and how significant is the threat of competition
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from new competitive or substitute industries or products by evaluating areas such as
government regulation and switching costs.
Threat of New Entrants
With or without deregulation, the threat of new entrants into the utility industry is
low. In 1998, when California implemented deregulation on its generation of electric
utilities, it required its electric utility companies to sell off all of their fossil fuel power
plants (Bohan, Sept 2001). However, each utility company still held control of their
individual power distribution network. In turn, if a new utility provider or a competitor
decided to enter the market, the firm would have to negotiate a rate to have access to that
distribution channel or incur a cost disadvantage by creating a new network. In
California creating a new power distribution network alongside an existing one would
create an environmental stir. For most consumers, if the price and the availability of the
utility were the same, the product differentiation and the switching costs would be low.
However, new entrants in the utility industry must deal with the large capital investment
requirements and the economies of scale necessary to recoup costs. Furthermore, state
regulatory bodies must approve new entrants; this process takes time and money.
Bargaining Power of Suppliers
In a regulated state, the utility company often owns the power plant supplying the
utility grid. In turn, the bargaining power is not applicable, because in a regulated
environment, the industry is normally vertically integrated in most areas. However, in
states such as California, the generation stipulation created suppliers that had contract
with the state. The utility companies were required by state law to purchase power
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through California's power exchange at rates higher than what they were allowed to
charge their customers (Bohan, Sept 2001). The suppliers created long-term contracts
with the state for too much power supplied at fixed high prices (SITREP, Aug 2001).
Both supply and prices are high in Texas as well; yet, Texas does not view itself as being
in the same situation as California (SITREP, Aug 15 2001). Texas is in the beginning
stages of deregulation and plans on changing its market design and has more plants on
the way (SITREP, Aug 15 2001).
Bargaining Power of Buyers
Just as the bargaining power of suppliers is high in the utility industry, the buyers
also have a great deal of control. Yet, most of this control comes from their voting power
to persuade the state and federal legislative bodies to control rates and approve and
disapprove policies. The ability to make business decisions based on electricity service
varies according to buyer group. For example, when the University of Cincinnati
evaluates Ohio's future possibilities of deregulation, they considered the limited size of
their institution, larger than a standard retail customer yet smaller than an automobile
plant or a military installation.
"From an institutional standpoint, either we have to get big enough that I can just sever from the
grid, or I've got to be somewhere in between, and be able - through the deregulated world- to
pick up power when we need it.. .They (the utility companies) have transmission lines, and if
we're going to have an interconnection, we need transportation capability. We're not going to
build transportation lines." (Wolverton, July 2001:16).

Hence, having a choice in generation when the local service company provides the
transmission capability does not give the medium and small consumer much bargaining
power other than their legislative power to vote. In other words, in those deregulated
states that will actively support distributed power, the large buyers or a cooperative of
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buyers co- located will be the only ones with the power of taking themselves off of the
utility company's transmission grid. Yet, even these buyers will be dependent on the
utility company or some service provider to offer interconnection.
Rivalry Among Competing Firms
In regulated markets, there is no rivalry in that local market among the utility
companies. Surprisingly, in deregulated markets, rivalry is low. Rivalry exists between
the utility companies and the state governments; debates over power plant approvals,
transmission line bottlenecks, set utility rates, and other related matters often cause
conflict between the deregulated utility provider and the state government. Perhaps a
source of friction among competing firms can be found in the transmission constraints.
Transmission bottlenecks can boost power costs. However, these costs would increase
for an entire area. For example, "the most costly bottleneck, according to the (FERC)
study, was the East-Central transmission link that moves electricity from upstate New
York, where there is plenty of power, to New York City, where there isn't. In the
summer of 2000, that trouble spot created congestion costs of $724.7 million, partly as a
result of the outage at the Indian Point nuclear-power plant on the New York side of the
bottleneck" (Smith, Dec 20 2001: A2). In so many words, rivalry for the congested
power may have been a problem at that time, but the state controlled the transmission
lines and power flows. Consequently, rivalry is low, as stated previously; there are more
reports of collusion among the industry's suppliers and buyers than there are reports of
contention among the main players.
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Threat of Substitute Products
For the most part, when evaluating an industries substitute products, a research
investigates substitute consumables the consumer would choose instead of the product in
the industry under investigation. In this particular instance, this thesis has concentrated
on the deregulated utility industry. In turn, substitute products could be viewed as an
alternative source of energy, or they could be deemed as an alternative source of
business, the regulated industry. This section believes the threat of substitute products on
the deregulation initiative is far greater from the regulated market than from any
alternative source of energy. Reports from all over the country and from multiple sources
are painting pictures of the failures and the problems in deregulated states:
"FERC found that summer bottlenecks were worst in those states that had deregulated their retail
markets" (Smith, Dec 20, 2001 :A2).
"California may be facing a persistent, escalating glut of electricity as a result of buying too much
power through long-term contracts, according to a Los Angeles Times analysis" (SITREP, Aug 15
2001).
"New England ISO says that customers are overpaying for electricity by $200 million to $600
million annually because of bottlenecks in the long-haul transmission grid" (SITREP, Aug 15
2001).
"Montana is now feeling the full impact of the (deregulation) plan the legislature passed several
years ago, with customers facing an increase in the neighborhood of 30 to 40%, depending on
their class of service" (SITREP, Nov 13 2001).
"In a move that surprised almost everyone, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
announced on 20 Nov that it will impose strict new price controls on some large power companies
whose size permits them to control electricity prices in their home markets" (SITREP, Dec 5
2001).

This last bullet creates an environment of regulation in the deregulated utility industry similar to the banking and financial industry described earlier. However, in this
particular case, the controls and the costs are such that the players may find themselves
more comfortable with the original regulated environment than the new deregulated
world. If this is the case, then the threat of the regulated utility company becoming a
substitute over a deregulated utility company may be high. "The staff of the Arkansas
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Public Service Commission announced their belief that electric deregulation in that state
should be scrapped or at least delayed until October 2004, because competition would
lead to higher prices. A study for the commission staff by Washington, D.C.-based
consultants La Carpa Associates said undeveloped wholesale electric markets would
cause higher, potentially volatile electric rates if retail market were deregulated"
(SITREP, Sep 14 2001). Other states such as Florida are also delaying deregulation
initiatives.
Summary
This chapter explored the concepts of energy and deregulation. The history of
energy consumption and energy supply was described. Then, the need for a conservation
of the finite fuels used was discussed. After this discussion, a description of the
regulatory guidance enacted to implement Congressional energy conservation goals was
detailed including an illustration of Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC).
Once ESPCs were described, literature concerning deregulation was reviewed. This
review included examples from the banking, insurance, public service, mass transit, and
airline industry in an effort to reveal the complex nature of deregulation and the
advantages and disadvantages of removing government intervention.
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III. Methodology
Introduction
Chapter one stated that there are unknown effects on Energy Savings Performance
Contracts (ESPC) and that deregulation may be one of those factors and may affect
guaranteed savings. In chapter two, the concepts of energy, energy regulations and
savings measures, ESPCs, and deregulation were described in a review of academic
literature. In this chapter, the case study is designed, described, and a report of the steps
to conducting case study research is explained.
Research Design
This research tests the influence of deregulation on ESPCs using a case study
research strategy. This section compares the case study approach to different research
strategies to illustrate the benefits of the case study methodology to this research effort.
Then, the type of case study used is described and evaluated for its strengths and
weaknesses and how its techniques combat the threats to validity and reliability. Finally,
the steps to conducting case study research are listed with essential details regarding the
population, sampling frame, data, data collection, and data analysis.
Case Study Methodology
Donald T. Campbell calls man a very competent knower. He explains that
common sense knowing is not replaced by quantitative knowing; instead, quantitative
knowing builds on qualitative perception. He explains that, as methodologists,
researchers must employ a strategy which integrates both (Campbell, 1975: 191).
Expounding on this hypothesis, Kathleen Eisenhardt explains that case studies are

44

research strategies which can use quantitative or qualitative data or a combination of the
two (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534). Case studies are comprehensive strategies that can provide
description, test theory, or generate theory (Eisenhardt, 1989: 535).
In an evaluation of such new phenomenon such as deregulation and ESPCs, an
applied epistemology, which integrates both qualitative and quantitative knowledge, may
provide a deeper insight into the interaction between deregulation and ESPCs. Case
study methodology is an effective research strategy for combining the two types of
knowledge in a manner which employs techniques such as pattern matching and context
dependence (Campbell, 1975:184). A case study is an empirical inquiry which studies
contemporary events in their real life context (Yin, 1994:13). However, there are six
research strategies which should be evaluated when developing a research design:
experiment, survey, archival analysis, document review, history, and case study (Yin,
1994:6). Case studies should be treated as a separate research strategy and not compared
to strategies using quasi-experiments, correlational studies, or panel designs.
Yet, before further exploration into the aspects of case study strategy is explored,
the appropriateness of a case study methodology must be explained. Thomas Bouchard
recommends that each researcher choose a method that is most likely to serve his/her
purpose rather than one that is most convenient or understood (Bouchard, 363). He also
recommends that more than one method be used whenever possible; this creates a greater
validity for the final analysis and conclusions. The unique strength of a case study is its
ability to deal with a variety of methods and data (Yin, 1994:8). Various research
strategies are not mutually exclusive. In turn, case studies may use surveys, statistical
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regression, historical studies, and interviews. Just as a literature review promotes more
insightful questions about a topic, case studies promote a more insightful look into
operational links that may need to be traced over time. Case studies are the preferred
strategy when investigating "how" or "why" questions, the focus is on contemporary
phenomenon in a real- life context, and the researcher has little control over events (Yin,
1994:1). An experiment focuses on a few variables in a laboratory setting. A history
concentrates on past phenomenon. A survey deals with phenomenon also, but its ability
to investigate is limited. An archival analysis cannot answer "how" or "why" questions.
A one-shot, post test-only design is not a case study; it is a quasi-experimental design.
This design is often confused with case study research, but the case study methodology
has its own research designs because of the nature of its strategies (Yin, 1994:19). Only a
case study can deal with many variables, multiple sources, and triangulation to guide data
collection and analysis (Yin, 1994: 13).
There are five components to a case study: questions, propositions, unit of
analysis, logic-linking data to propositions, and criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin,
1994: 26).

Each individual case in a study is considered equal to an individual

experiment (Yin, 1994: 46). In turn, multiple case studies help promote replication logic
which is different than sampling logic. Replication logic reduces the threat of external
validity (Yin, 1994:33).
Case studies are more explanatory and deal with links that cannot be discovered
by mere frequency. Research questions, which are concerned with prevalence, may be
conducted in surveys or analysis of archival records. Research questions, which ask
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"hows" and "whys", favor the use of experiments, histories, or case studies. An
experiment separates the phenomenon from the context so that a few variables may be
studied. Investigators need control over behavioral events. Histories are not able to
research new phenomenon. Both ESPCs and deregulation are contemporary
phenomenon difficult to reproduce in a laboratory setting. The goal of this research
effort is to perform an analytical generalization, not a statistical generalization, of the
relationship between these phenomenon (Yin, 1994:9). In turn, case study methodology
serves as the most effective strategy for conducting this research.
Campbell recommends "triangulation" and "pattern matching" which can be used
as part of the case study strategy (Campbell, 1975: 182-184). Triangulation seeks to
achieve realism or reduce construct validity threats in a study by employing multiple
methods focused on examining the same construct from independent points of
observation. In pattern matching, several pieces of information from the same case are
evaluated to determine whether the data matches one potential pattern better than another
(Yin, 1994:25).
Case Study Design
Eisenhardt recommends cross-case comparisons to achieve stronger construct and
external validity (Eisenhardt, 1989:545). Dyer and Wilkins disagree; they recommend
within-case comparisons to achieve a deeper understanding of the constructs studied
(Dyer and Wilkins, 1991:614). Yin proposes that there are four types of case studies that
can be used, each with its own strengths and weaknesses (Yin, 1994:39). There are
single case designs with a single unit of analysis, single case designs with multiple units

47

of analysis, multiple case designs with a single unit of analysis, and multiple case designs
with multiple units of analysis. This research effort uses a case study design labeled
Type IV, a multiple case design with multiple units of analysis. This design uses withincase comparisons as recommended by Dyer and Wilkins and cross-case comparisons as
recommended by Eisenhardt by conducting each single case in a manner similar to
conducting a single experiment. The final analysis is then similar to a cross-experiment
design and logic (Yin, 1994:46). Each case is studied independently, and then each
"experiment" is compared to the other "experiments" to evaluate replication in findings.
Threats
Dooley states that the quality of a research effort is judged on two dimensions:
reliability and validity (Dooley, 2001:77). Yin proposes tactics that may be used in
various case study designs to minimize the threats of construct validity, internal validity,
external validity, and reliability (Yin, 1994:33). This research effort will employ several
of these tactics; the applicable ones are described in this section. In the data collection
phase, multiple sources of evidence will be used to combat the threats of external
validity. This threat will also be minimized in the same phase by using a chain of
evidence, or a case study database which details the data source, data, and the data
collection techniques. Additionally, external validity will be minimized in the research
design phase by adopting a multiple case study approach, an approach which uses
replication, not sampling, logic giving each case the weight of a single research effort
(Yin, 1994:46). A multiple case study reduces the threat of external validity by seeking a
replication of results across cases. In the data collection phase, the threat to internal
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validity will be minimized using a pattern matching analysis technique, a technique
described later in this chapter. The dimension of reliability will be strengthened through
a development of a case study protocol, the case study database, and the strict adherence
to the guidelines in the protocol.

These tactics will be illustrated in the depiction of the

case study steps that were followed.
Case Study Procedure
There are nine steps to a multiple case study strategy (Yin, 1994:49). First, as
with many strategies, the researcher develops a theory. The second step, the most critical
to the dimension of reliability, is designing the case study protocol. Next, cases are
selected. Then, the case studies are conducted. Each case study is conducted separately,
and, in the fifth step, individual case reports are written. Within-case comparisons are
made at that time. It is not until the sixth step that cross-case comparisons are made and
conclusions are drawn. In step seven, theory may be modified as necessary. Then, step
eight, policy implications are developed so that a final case report, step nine, may be
written. Using these steps, this research design was developed.
Data Collection
The case study protocol is a step-by-step guide used for describing how data will
be collected and how this data will be analyzed. Adherence to this protocol gives the
researcher consistency in evaluating each case. This protocol is described in these next
two sections: Data Collection and Data Analysis.
The population studied is the Air Force Energy Savings Performance Contract
(ESPC). Using the Type IV, multiple case multiple units of analysis approach, each
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individual Air Force base reflects one case, and each task Order (TO) emulates a subunit
of analysis. Subunits of analysis also include observation of TO execution activities and
contract activities; open, informal interviews with personnel associated with each TO;
document review of the contract statement of work, contract clauses, and financial
payback sections; and meetings and conferences to gather information and relevant data
for evaluating each ESPC. The data consists of a collection of meeting notes, interview
transcripts, Regional ESPCs, the five installations, the corresponding TOs studied, and
other documents and archival data collected from a theoretical, not random sampling.
The five installations studied were selected from a sampling frame, or list of all AF
installations engaging in or considering ESPC TOs, provided from the Air Force Civil
Engineering Support Agency (AFCESA). These installations, or cases, were selected
using theoretical sampling, described by Eisenhardt, to allow the research to focus efforts
on theoretically useful cases (Eisenhardt, 1989:533). Secondary data collection, in the
form of personal observation, came from ESPC regional conference and meeting notes,
and ESPC decision memorandums. To perform the theoretical sampling, cases will be
selected to provide a diverse selection of bases. Bases (in urban or rural areas, in highly
populated areas or sparsely populated areas, in locations affected by deregulation, and in
different regions of the country and employing different types of TOs) were chosen.
These five bases provide a representative sampling of populations, utility issues, energy
conservation measures, and contract actions. However, it is the TOs at these bases that
provide the primary focus of the data analysis.
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Population
Type

#ofTOs
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Case Bases
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0
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No
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4

1

0
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5
1
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2
2
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03

s

U

Seasonal/Warm
Suburban
Warm/Humid
Rural
Warm
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Case Base Sampling Frame

+^
WD
'«

Q

Yes
No
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The data collection at each installation was adapted according to each base's
situation. At one installation, there were two utility providers servicing electricity for the
base. At another installation, the terrorist bombing on United States soil ended the case
study visit, and the remaining information collection was performed via e-mail,
telephone, or on-line. The manner in which information was conducted at each
installation is listed below.
At each installation, contract files were reviewed, and contracting personnel were
asked document clarification questions as necessary. In addition, contracting personnel
were asked if they wished to provide any written, oral, or e-mail information regarding
their energy savings contracts. Government engineers were also asked document
clarification questions when necessary. In addition, these engineers were asked to
provide information on whether their installation experienced any load changes or any
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utility rate changes. Also, they were asked if they wished to provide any further written,
oral, or e-mail communication regarding the ESPCs.
Base A
A case analysis was conducted at Base A from 20-24 August 2001. Moreover,
during the Base A case analysis, the utility company was contacted. An analysis of the
Demand Side Management Agreement (DSMA) that Base A awarded to the utility
provider was also given a document review, and a document clarification interview of the
utility company as a contractor was conducted due to the fact that the DSMA appeared
related to the ESPC. An open interview of the contractor as a utility provider followed
immediately. Finally, this case study includes an interview with both a Public Utility
Service Commissioner and the assistant which was followed up later with a utility rate
analysis e-mailed to the researcher. Base A's ESCO was contacted by phone, but only to
receive schedule information which was missing from the files and unknown by the
government personnel (an issue to be discussed later) - not for interview or document
analysis.
BaseB
A case analysis was conducted at Base B from 10-11 September 2001. Moreover,
during the Base B case analysis, the September 11th terrorist bombing occurred in New
York City and Washington D.C., and base employees returned to their homes. In turn,
any document clarification questions were performed via phone or e-mail.
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BaseC
A case analysis was conducted at Base C from 17-21 September 2001. Moreover,
during the Base C case analysis, the two local utility companies were contacted.
BaseD
A case analysis was conducted at Base D from 24-28 September 2001. Moreover,
during the Base D case analysis, the utility company was contacted. Finally, this case
study includes interviews with contacts from the Air Force Civil Engineering Support
Agency (AFCESA) which was located within a 100-mile radius of the installation.
AFCESA
After visiting with Base D and the local utility provider, the case analysis portion
was complete for that installation and the remainder of the week was spent speaking with
the AFCESA representatives. During that time, clarification questions which could not
be answered at other installations were answered. Also, it was discovered that the state in
which Region 6 was located was negotiating a utility provider agreement that would be
determined in November. This agency became the primary source for the remainder of
any utility questions and all ESPC clarification issues.
BaseE
A case analysis was conducted at Base E from 1-4 October 2001.
Data Analysis
Pattern matching is the primary method to be used in this research effort for
analyzing each type of data. Pattern matching is the process of linking data to some
theoretical proposition (Campbell, 1975:182). Once data collection is completed and
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entered into the research database, individual case analysis is conducted. Within-case
analysis is conducted to gain familiarity with data and perform preliminary hypothesis
testing (Eisenhardt, 1989:533). As individual case reports are written, the first stage of
pattern matching begins. First, the research relies on the theoretical proposition deregulation is a factor influencing the guaranteed savings of ESPCs. Second, in order to
perform pattern matching, the research divides this theory into effect and no-effect
propositions, similar to null hypothesis testing - deregulation influences guaranteed
savings, deregulation does not influence guaranteed savings. With these two propositions
stated, when data is collected, it may be evaluated and placed under the effect or noeffect proposition to support or refute the original theory.
The criteria for interpreting each case for theory evaluation has five main
divisions: state deregulation status, utility rate stability, guaranteed savings analysis,
contract management, and contractor performance. For purposes of analysis and
evaluation the constructs will be defined and measured as such:
Construct

Definition

Scale

Deregulation

Electric Utility Status in State

Yes/No

Utility Prices

No fluctuations in price
Price spike or prices increasing
Prices increasing/decreasing

Stable
Fluctuating
Volatile

Savings

On metered buildings
On non-meteredfacilities

Metered
Stipulated by Contractor

Contract
Management

Contract documentation and correspondence
Lack of contractor documentation and
correspondence

Documentation

Contractor
Performance

Perceived performance problems
No perception of performance problems
Table 2. Definition of Constructs
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No Documentation
Government Complaints/
No Government
Complaints Noted

Gas deregulation is not a measurement of this thesis; gas deregulation has affected
most states since 1986 (Santoro, Sept 2001). Each case evaluation defines its
deregulation status by the electric utility legislation in the state. If competitive generation
legislation has been implemented, then deregulation is labeled "yes". Otherwise, this
construct is labeled "no". Utility prices and their trends are varying across country.
Installation localities that have had a constant average price during the past twelve
months have "stable" utility prices. Installation states, that have seen seasonal price
spikes or a steady increase or decrease within the past twelve months suggesting a trend,
have "fluctuating" utility prices. Installations located in areas that experienced
unexpected increases or decreases in prices during the past twelve months are considered
to have "volatile" utility prices.
The construct of savings is the core of this thesis effort. Installations are
guaranteed to receive a repayment of expenditures (contractor payment) through the
energy savings reflected in reduced utility bills. Each case is evaluated on the method
used to measure and evaluate these savings. If energy savings measures are performed
on facilities that have individual metering, then the construct of savings is labeled
"metered". If energy savings measures are implemented in facilities without individual
meters, then savings are labeled as "stipulated by contractor". In those instances, the
facilities share meters with other buildings on the installation. In turn, the contractor
stipulates that the energy savings measure will give the government savings, and thus, the
government begins making contractor payments once the energy savings measure has
been constructed and accepted. There are no individual meters on those facilities to
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measure or evaluate whether the energy savings measure is solely responsible for
lowering the installation's utility bills. In ESPCs, all savings are guaranteed by the
ESCO. In this construct, "metered" savings are those guaranteed savings that the
government can verify on individually metered facilities. "Stipulated" savings represent
guaranteed savings that the government cannot easily assess. These savings are reflected
in the installation's overall utility bill and may be influenced by other factors. In turn, the
base civil engineers review the contractor's justification of the quarterly and annual
savings. In both, stipulated and metered environments, contractor quarterly and annual
reconciliations must be performed; however, the justification of savings becomes critical
in the stipulated environment without the availability of individual meters to measure
each project's savings, or losses.
Contract management at each installation involves the relationship between the
contracting office, the government civil engineers, and the ESCO. When evaluating the
government team, the construct of contract management is defined as the understanding
of ESPCs, the handling of documents and correspondence, the management of the
contractor, and whether training was required. If basic file work was inadequate or the
team had difficulty documenting contractor difficulties, then the construct of contract
management was labeled "No Documentation". Otherwise, this construct was labeled
"Documentation".
Contractor Performance involves perceptions of the government employees at the
case installations studies. Because of the subjective nature of performance, contractor
performance is defined simply as perceived performance problems. Government
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engineers complained that several performance problems went beyond that of normal
performance issues. Additionally, several quality problems were greater than that found
in other contracts. Some of these engineers perceived problems with contractor
performance. Due to the vague nature of this construct, the scale label consists simply of
perceived complaints or the lack of these complaints, "Government Complaints/No
Government Complaints Noted".
Once within-case pattern matching was performed, cross-case pattern matching
was conducted. A cross-case pattern search forces the investigator to look beyond the
initial impression and see evidence through multiple lenses (Eisenhardt, 1989:533). At
this juncture, replication logic is critical to drawing cross-case conclusions, step six.
There was no disparity between cases; in turn, there was no need to modify theory and
perform a new multiple case study. Consistency was found and conclusions can be
supported, thus implications are discussed along with recommendations. Particularly,
deregulations impact on the payback time of ESPCs along with the other constructs is
evaluated, and the pattern-matching table illustrates what patterns may be reflected across
cases. This thesis is limited in determining which characteristic will be more probable
than another. However, the pattern-matching illustrates whether deregulation is a
common influence and whether it is the only unique influence on TOs that do not comply
with original payback time guarantees.
Summary
This chapter discussed the case study technique used for performing this research
effort. First, the case study methodology was described and a comparison was made
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between case study and other research strategies. This comparison served as the basis for
supporting case study use for this research. Next, the specific type of case study design
was detailed and evaluated for its effectiveness. In turn, the study explained how it
proposed to use various techniques to minimize the threats to validity and reliability.
Then, the steps to conducting a multiple case study design were presented. Finally, data
collection and data analysis, the elements to case study protocol, were defined for this
study.
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IV. Findings and Analysis
Introduction
This chapter will provide an individual case analysis of each base studied. Each
analysis was conducted through on-site visits with government personnel. The names of
each base have been deleted to protect anonymity of the personnel and the information
provided. Each individual analysis will be summarized and compared for a cross-case
comparison discussion of the findings and recommendations. Overall, each base
analyzed managed at least one TO. Table 3 provides a representation of the base TOs
reviewed.
Base

#TOs

Dollar Value

Base
A

1

$4,300,673

$8,806,329

DSM

$1,853,207

$4,019,027

Base
B

1

$4,199,813

$11,904,830

I Iiuh Temperature 1 lot \\ alcr Sxslcm cV:
Chiller IMants

Base
C

2

$2,472,694

$1,306,451

HVAC, lighting, water conservation,
lighting retrofits, compressed air, etc
Exterior lighting and water
conservation

Base

Financed
Value

Base-wide facility upgrades (lighting,
plumbing, etc.)
Propane Mixing Plant

$293,599

$427,231

1

$134,197

$241,942

Lighting, ventilation control, motors,
etc.

2

$1,674,150

$2,873,529

Thermal Storage & Variable Volume
Chilled Water Pumping Systems
Military Family Housing Radio
Frequency Controllers

[)

Base
E

Description

$446,474

$836,730

Table 3. Base Task Order (TO) Description
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Base A
Base A is located in Region 3. Base A has one ESPC TO and one DSMA TO.
Base A began two energy savings projects with two separate contractors at the same time.
Although DSMAs are not the topic of interest, reviewing Base A's DSMA was
significant in discovering the possibility that this installation may have been paying for
two conservation efforts that may be creating an overlap of savings. The propane mixing
plant project in the DSMA reduces energy expenditures on Base A; this same area has an
ESPC which guarantees energy reductions. Consequently, by implementing two energy
savings measures with two separate contractors, there may be a possibility of overlap.
Deregulation
Electricity has not been deregulated. A committee has met to discuss
deregulating the electricity industry and is scheduled to appear before the state legislative
body in 2003. Deregulation may occur as soon as 2004. However, cooperatives are
common. In rural areas where the population is even scarcer than the small towns,
farmers obtain and maintain their own source of energy with financial assistance from the
federal government.
Utility Prices
The utility provider and the civil engineers both report that although last winter
experienced increased gas utility prices, electric prices are stable in the state. Overall, the
public utility commission agrees that the electric utility prices are low and constant. The
Public Utility Commissioner Assistant explained that there is a fuel clause adjustment
which causes monthly rate changes, but these changes have remained level.
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Savings
ESCO performs the measurement, verification, and reporting. To someone
outside of the ESPC climate, this appears to be a conflict of interest; it is as if the person
performing the work is also the person who writes the performance appraisal on the work
performed. Measurement and Verification have not been placed on strictly metered
areas, and savings have been designated as stipulated. Because of this stipulation in
savings, issues such as possible overlaps in energy conservation contracts are not easily
resolved. For example, the DSMA contract does not reduce energy consumption; it
allows Base A to change its utility rates from firm to interruptible utility rates. During
the interruptible time periods, the base switches to the propane mixing plant. This saves
Base A dollars off of the utility bill. The ESPC savings measure guarantees that its
project will reduce energy consumption and save utility bill dollars. However, in a
stipulated savings environment, specific figures regarding savings are unknown.

Contract Management
Base A's ESPC TO 1 is for base-wide facilities upgrades in the amount of
$4,300,673.00 at an interest rate of 8.75 percent. The contractor proposed eight
individual Energy Conservation Projects (ECPs); seven will be implemented. The
propane mixing plant project proposed by the ESCO was transferred to the DSMA. The
eight ECPs proposed by the ESCO include: (1) Energy Efficient Lighting; (2) Heat
Exchanger Controls; (3) New Plumbing Fixtures; (4) Propane Mixing Plant; (5) High
Efficient Laundry; (6) VFDs on Hospital Fans; (7) Pride Building Retrofit; and (8)
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Insulate Above Ground HTHW Piping. The expected annual cost savings for this TO is
approximately $617,988 and $8,784,439 for the entire payback period. The monthly
payment for the period is $51,499 for 171 months or $8,806,329 for the entire payback
period. The simple payback period is 6.5 years, but with the interest included, the
payback period becomes 14.25 years.
Base A received the Phase I report on 16 July 1999. The RCO issued the ESCO
a notice to proceed with Phase II on 10 September 1999. Due to unknown circumstances,
the installation Contracting Officer also issued a notice to proceed with Phase II to the
ESCO but on 9 November 1999. Initial correspondence did not appear to include the
installation contracting office. There are some areas of significance. For example, Base
A contracting personnel appear to lack the necessary training important to administer the
task order. Utilities privatization is a term used for the ESPC projects at this installation.
Payment issues and government savings are often unclear to the personnel. Also, the
length of time from Phase I start to construction complete is lengthy. Base A received a
Phase I report from the ESCO on 16 July 1999, but as of 14 August 2001, construction
for Phase III had not begun. The ESCO was tasked and had agreed to have construction
complete by April 2001 but had failed in this arrangement. The question arises as to
whether ESPC installation-contracting officers should receive any consideration from the
ESCOs for delays as mandated with other government contracts. Furthermore, it is
necessary to note that the termination payout schedule begins with a higher dollar amount
than the regular payout schedule.

Also, in regards to the payment schedule, there is no

allowance for an automatic recalculation if utility rates change; the payment schedule
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must be modified with a bilateral modification - a possible problem if the government
and contractor can not agree on what is fair and reasonable.
Contractor Performance
The amount of total contractor payments, $4,300,673, remained the same in
several contract revisions. Ho wever, the guaranteed government savings changed in
several of the revisions although the government savings should equal or exceed
contractor payments and the propane project was removed from the contract.
Additionally, ECP 2 (Exterior Lighting Controls) incurred an annual cost of $243,799 but
only received an annual guaranteed savings of $20,077; savings should be greater than
costs not less. Although costs can be greater than savings for individual projects as long
as savings are greater than costs overall, such a difference in one ECP for a simple energy
measure created questions the engineers had to investigate when the researcher asked for
clarification. Furthermore, the ESCO repeatedly pressured the installation commander to
push the project along. Additional attempts to influence contract award included
arranging a meeting with base officials in December, 2000 to brief them on ESPCs, the
savings that the ESCO proposes, and the future steps to implementation. Finally, when
the researcher contacted the ESCO during the on-site case study to receive an updated
schedule (as one was not in the file), the ESCO stated that an updated schedule had not
been made due to the ESCO's search for qualified subcontractors. The contract award
had been made several months prior, and before award, subcontractors are to be selected
in advance per AFCESA guidelines (ESPC Intro, 2000). The ESCO had been negligent
by not fulfilling this requirement.
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Base A Summary
The utility industry is not deregulated in this state. Utility prices have been stable.
However, contract management personnel need improvement on ESPC procedures.
There are stipulated savings on Base B. Although the government does not truly
understand how to manage ESPCs, the contracting personnel do understand there may be
perceived performance issues with the contractor. In turn, there have been complaints of
contractor performance.
Base A Construct Summary Table
Deregulation

No

I'tilitv Prices

Stable

Savings

Stipulated

Contract Management

No Documentation

Contractor Performance

Government Complaints

Table 4. Base A Construct Summary Table

BaseB
Base B is located in Region 4. The primary focus of the energy measure of the
ESPC project at Base B involves chiller plant modifications.
Deregulation
The electric utility is deregulated. In January 2000, the legislation approved the
restructuring of competition, but it was open for all residential customers by January
2001 (EIA, 2002). Initially, Base B was a potential case affected by deregulation.
Because the main purpose of this particular TO was to save on demand cost based on
projections of on-peak and off-peak rates, a government engineer's statement that the
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installation's utility provider had recently announced that it would change its billing
structure from a variable rate to a flat rate fee became critical. When later clarifying the
purpose of this change with AFCESA, they confirmed that utility companies would do
this to ease administrative burdens and costs. However, at the end of the case study, it
was discovered that the utility company did not switch billing structures.
Utility Prices
Utility prices have been fluctuating in this region as a result of bottlenecks in the
distribution system. Initially, deregulation efforts proposed a rate freeze on utility prizes
through 2005. However, legislation proposed rates be reduced by 7 percent. In the end,
utility prices decreased and increased due to legislative influences, transmission
constraints, and distribution concerns.
Savings
Savings are stipulated for Base B's ESPC. Additionally, out of the $3,266,401 in
project cost improvements, the ECP, Improve Chiller Plant, for $2,079,171 never will
have a guaranteed savings to the government.
This is not a unique situation for ESPCs. The
annual guaranteed savings amount is totaled by the
ESCO as the capital cost plus the operation and
maintenance costs see Figure 5. Before this happens,

Total Project Direct Costs
+ Financing Procurement Fee
=Total Direct Costs
+Project Markup
=Total Capital Cost
Figure 5. Project Cost Example

the ESCO calculates the total capital cost by adding project costs, financing fees, and
other project markups. Once this figure is calculated, then the ESCO uses the finance
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term, an interest rate for the capital cost, and an inflation rate for the operation and
maintenance cost. In actuality, the government's payment of $11,904,830 for the
$3,266,401 project does not include the $3,389,261 fee of operation and maintenance
costs.

Contract Management
Base B has one ESPC TO in the amount of $4,199,813 for 6 energy conservation
projects (ECPs). The primary focus of the project is to improve the installations High
Temperature Hot Water (HTHW) System and Chiller plants. Out of the six ECPs, three
do not create cost savings. However, the overall project still has a savings greater than
cost benefit. Additionally, when the engineer was asked why individual projects were
chosen that had costs greater than savings, he explained that in order to achieve the final
outcome, some improvements had to be made to the chiller plants. The previous
contractor responsible for the chiller plants had left the installation under a default
situation, and the plants were in need of some repair before they could be modified for
conservation efforts. However, the interest rates and overhead charges of ESPCs over a
period of 20 years may be a costly method to fix the default contractor's mistakes. Yet,
this installation must deal with not only the military personnel that other installations
must manage but also a 70 percent civilian turnover rate in the contract management
office. Yet, in the long run, one must evaluate this contract that has total project costs of
$3,266,401 but a payment to the contractor of $11,904,830.
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One way this installation helped manage the contract and overcome the problems
with personnel turnover is noteworthy. The base contracting office used Texas A&M
University to act as a third party to serve as an advisor to solve difference's of opinion on
contract issues before the Task Order was signed. Additionally, although this installation
had a grasp of the contract situation, the contracting office lacked pricing memorandums,
site visit reports, etc. The contracting officer stated that payments have been delayed six
months due to delay in chiller monitoring modifications. The government civil engineers
will not accept the contractor's chiller monitoring modifications, because they believe
that these adaptations are below quality. As a result, the ESCO cannot begin receiving
payments for savings until the government signs full acceptance. The contracting officer
stated that this has motivated the ESCO to fix the work correctly. At the time of the case
analysis visit, the construction complete date was six mo nths overdue. The contracting
officer also stated that this particular ESCO had been taken over by one of the ESCOs
from another region. Contractor correspondence reflected the changes in their corporate
management.

Contractor Performance
The base civil engineers delayed accepting the final TO for over six months after
the scheduled date due to the Heat Plant monitoring device. However, the government
engineers felt that this was not necessarily a problem with the contractor but a problem
with an understanding of the contract language. In other words, the base civil engineers
believed a strict interpretation of the Heating Plant's monitoring was crucial to the
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verification of savings. In turn, they believed that the slightest deviation in performance
or product would affect the justification of guarantees. Consequently, the construction
acceptance had performance problems, but the government engineers understood these
problems did not exceed normal performance challenges.
Base B Summary
The electric utility has been deregulated. Utility prices have increased in this
region. Contracting personnel understands basic ESPC procedures and appeared
effectively able to manage any ESCO issues. The files were not kept as formal contract
files, and many formal contract documents were missing. This base collaborated with a
third party, Texas A&M University, in negotiating the measurement and verification
portion of the contract. Although savings are stipulated, the monitoring and controls on
the largest energy control project, the Chiller Plant, has been strongly inspected by the
government engineers before the contract will be termed "construction complete".

Base B Construct Summary Table
Deregulation

Yes

I'tiliU Prices

Fluctuating

Savings

Stipulated

(outmet Management

No Documentation

Contractor Performance

No Government Complaints Noted

Table 5. Base B Construct Summary Table
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BaseC
Base C is located in Region 5 and is particularly large with 5,000 acres and 1,800
buildings. Base 5 has two ESPC TOs and is serviced by two electric utility providers.
The first TO is in the amount of $427,231 from 25 November 98 to 10 September 2020 22 years. The project is for exterior lighting and water conservation. TO#2 (5001) is a
combination of projects including HVAC, lighting, water conservation, Energy
Management Control Systems (EMCS), lighting retrofits, and compressed air. TO#2
(5001) totals $2,472,694 and covers 14 years from 15 May 2000 to 14 May 2014.
Deregulation
Electric utility restructuring was enacted by the legislature in September 1996 and
in 1998 deregulation was open to all consumers (EIA, 2002). However, after the case
study analysis was complete, retail choice was suspended in October 2001; deregulation
had been replaced by re-regulation (EIA, 2002).
Utility Prices
Local utility specialists explained that although the area's population has been
increasing, the energy consumption has been decreasing. In turn, load growth has been
progressively decreasing. Furthermore, utility prices are affected by the state contract
utility prices. Because the utility companies had to sell their generation facilities during
deregulation efforts and then these same utility companies became non-credit worthy, the
utility companies must purchase energy from the State Department of Water Resources
(DWR). The DWR purchased energy in 15- and 20-year contracts at high prices. Due to
those long-term mortgage agreements, all of the utility providers had to change their rates
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when they signed new contracts with installations around the state. Base C signed a
contract from 2005 to 2024 agreeing to how much power its wants and when, and Base C
pays a percentage according to how much it costs the hydro facility to produce the power.
Previous utility prices were volatile. When the state deregulated the generation of
electricity in 1998, the state made the stipulation that utility companies sell off all of their
fossil fuel plants. Then, the state imposed rate caps and forced the utility companies to
purchase power through the state's power exchange. Yet, the power exchange exceeded
the rates that they were allowed to charge their customers. In turn, some providers had to
borrow amounts totaling $9 billion to buy power, because they could not afford the
discrepancy in prices. These providers then became non-credit worthy. By state laws,
once the utility provider became non-credit worthy, it was not allowed to buy power any
longer and the state became involved. One utility company declared bankruptcy.
Another chose to go to legislation instead and is still having problems getting bonds.
Another utility company fared better because of its electric power from hydrodams. Yet,
one company is considering a 40 percent increase in utility rates in a 2004 agreement.
Electric utility rates should further increase in winter as natural gas prices increase,
because many plants are natural gas fired.
Yet, overall, the volatility of rate swings in the market has settled down. These
swings were tied mostly to natural gas. Fortunately for Base C, the primary electric
utility provider is a hydrodam-based company. This company sells for only cost-base
rates by law, and these rates are generally lower than market rates even during off-peak
times by law. This utility provider is a different type of company than the other electric
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Utilities. Most of its power is obligated to sell to only wholesale power although the state
considers Base C a retail entity, and its power has to use another company's transmission
lines to get to Base C. However, that other company charges the provider a monthly
capacity rate. If market pricing does come into effect, it will not affect this company and
hence not Base C. This company has an agreed upon rate for its transmission line usage
good until 2004; afterwards, however, Base C only gets a percentage of this company's
allotments.
Savings
Although savings are also stipulated at Base C, it is possible that there will not be
a savings guarantee met the year the analysis was conducted on the stipulated savings.
The ESCO guarantees the government savings each year; this satisfies Air Force energy
mandates and financing reductions.
On 13 December 1999, the ESCO submitted its annual verification report. It
stated that the first year's savings for TO#l (5000) was $145.51. The government
disagreed with the contractor's second annual verification report, submitted on 08
February 2001. The government disputed the report's statements that there was a
cumulative energy cost avoidance of $33,690.73 (previous year $145.51), a cost
avoidance of $16,845.50 for the year (previous $145.51), and a cumulative savings of
$292.73. Because savings are stipulated at this installation, the government must press
the contractor to resubmit the report with better figures. The lack of individual meters on
each of the government facilities prevents the government engineers from measuring the
savings accurately.
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The government civil engineers discovered that on TO#l the baseline rates to
calculate savings were agreed and set firm in the contract document. However, these
baseline rates were questionable in TO#2. Additionally, the engineers stated that there
were quality issues with the EMCS, lighting, and lighting retrofits that would affect the
savings the government receives. Furthermore, the government engineers complained of
paying a contractor for service without savings even if the contractor stipulated that
savings had been received. In the engineer's view, this is a problem with the overall
ESPC concept. The contractor makes the improvement, stipulates that savings have been
made, and submits annual reports verifying measurements that can hardly be taken
without proper metering devices on individual facilities which received improvements.
Contract Management
Each contract file contained documentation of every contracting action.
Additionally, records illustrated the installation's use of price negotiation, invoice
reconciliation, and other contracting documents to manage the ESPC TOs.
Memorandums between the contracting and civil engineering squadrons documented
communication efforts regarding contractor actions and contract concerns. All activities
regarding the contract were recorded and filed appropriately; moreover, the contracting
office and base civil engineers performed the activities required to effectively manage the
ESPC TOs. Activities acknowledged included follow-up correspondence when the
contractor failed to complete an activity or submit a report. Other activities noted
reflected the procedure of contractor contact, i.e. the base civil engineers contacted the
contracting office when a problem or an issue arose and the contracting office contacted
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the ESCO. Contract files were complete with internal and external correspondence,
invoices, acquisition plans, the contract and modifications, and documentation of training
qualifications.
Although there were no contract management issues between the government
civil engineers and the contracting office, there were a significant amount of
memorandums regarding the expenditure of funds and paying the contractor. The
interesting notation is that the financial community at this installation may not be
comfortable with the financial obligation process of ESPC. Once the contractor began
submitting correct invoices, the government paid interest penalties for three months due
to its failure to pay the contractor.
Contractor Performance
The first TO began October 1998 and was construction complete by the end of
November 1998. In turn, initial performance was not a concern. Soon after, contractor
contract administration became a concern when the contractor consistently failed to
submit correct invoices. Finally, when the contractor learned the correct method of
submitting an invoice for payment, the government failed to submit contractor payment.
Eventually, the concerns were resolved until the second annual reconciliation. Yet, these
concerns were not issues of contractor performance. Perceptions of contractor
performance did not appear until the second annual reconciliation and until quality issues
with the EMCS and some of the lighting retrofits were beyond that of contractor
negligence. For example, engineers discovered that the lighting retrofit project did not
receive a true energy conservation improvement. The ESCO did not compensate for
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damaged lighting when performing savings assessments. In other words, the ESCO
agreed to conduct an evaluation of the hangars, reduce hangar energy consumption, and
reduce hangar lighting levels. However, in the end, the ESCO allowed for lights that had
been burnt out or damaged in its initial assessment; this factor affected the end result.
Base C engineers claim that the lighting retrofit project is not an improvement to the
facility; any savings earned are due to the failure to achieve proper lighting levels.
Overall, the engineers view performance for this ESCO to be beyond that of normal
quality problems. There was the perceived belief that the contractor was purposely
installing faulty product in an attempt to save costs.
Base C Summary
Deregulation is active in this state, and utility prices are volatile. Savings have
been stipulated. Although the financial community has concerns, there were no
discrepancies found in the contract management team. Furthermore, even though the
performance began without problems during the first TO, the government complained of
perceived contractor performance issues as the ESPCs progressed.
Base C Construct Summary Table
Deregulation
Yes
Utility Prices

Volatile

Savings

Stipulated

Contract Mana »ement

Documentation

Contractor Per formance

Government Complaints

Table 6. Base C Construct Summary Table
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BaseD
Base D is located in Region 3 in a regulated utility state. Base D has one ESPC
TO for lighting, ventilation control, motors, and Energy Management System
Enhancement (EMSE) for $241,942.92 and 156 payment months or 13 years. Payments
began after construction was accepted in January 2001.
Deregulation
The state conducted a twenty-year study into deregulation, and although there was
a proposal due back by December 1, 2001, there will be no deregulation on the retail
level (Base D) for at least 10 years. There may be a move to deregulating wholesale
customers - customers that own all of their distribution systems but ha\e to purchase
power, like a town or a city. Deregulation in that area may be 5 years away. Overall,
deregulation is not a threat to the local utility company which is a subsidiary of one of the
lowest costs producers in the country.
Utility Prices
The local utility provider is coal fired and is coming under scrutiny of air
emissions advocates, yet this energy source is a factor in the state's low and stable
electric utility prices. Utility price stability since 1989 may be due to the energy source
and to the management of the utility companies. Although the local utility company has
had 300,000 more customers, it has kept the same number of employees. A rate increase
petition with the Public Utility Commission will be the first rate relief requested since
1989, and it would go for commercial operation investment into retail cost - a $40
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million cost starting July 1, 2002. This would increase Base D's base rates by 4.5
percent.
Utility pricing in the state has affected on Base D's ability to contract an ESPC.
First, establishing the baseline utility rate for the TO was difficult for the potential
contractors wishing to bid on the proposed effort. At the time of the solicitation, the state
was experimenting with Real Time Pricing which is similar to market pricing. The utility
company began a pilot program of proprietary utility rates in June 1999 till May 2000.
The problem with it was that there was no real rate structure. Rates fluctuated by the
hour. The installation could call up the utility provider the night before and receive an
estimate of the approximate peak prices, but these were just estimates. During this time,
rates were determined based on whatever it cost to generate power during that hour, and
the state commission had to approve. Since the local utility provider did not wish to
reveal the proprietary manner Real Time Pricing was calculated, the utility company
provided the contract bidders with only the utility history of the three years prior to the
contract bid. Overall, from the time of the case analysis visit back 10 years including the
experimental Real Time Pricing, there has been no significant rate change - the rate has
fluctuated around 4 cents consistently. In fact, the utility is seeking permission from the
state to increase rates. This situation creates a second problem for the final contractor,
the ESCO. At first, the ESCO had difficulty obtaining rate information, then the ESCO
had difficulty generating savings on an installation with very inexpensive utility prices.
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Savings
Although Base D uses individually metered facilities to measure and verify
energy reductions, base civil engineers comment that there are still other factors
interfering with a true measurement of guaranteed government savings. For example,
these civil engineers stated that the main concern is that the maintenance cost is the
hidden cost part, and that this cost is not truly considered when thinking about the value
of ESPCs. When the engineers were forced to choose a project for their installation they
chose only metered buildings so that the government engineers could check the
contractor's measurement and verification. The engineers wanted to note that ESPC
programs could not work on A-76 bases unless you have a way of negotiating in the
maintenance costs or you have the money to burn on duplicate maintenance costs. The
rationale behind their thought is that both contracts create two sets of service contractors
providing maintenance at a facility, although ESPC does not advertise to be that type of
contract vehicle. Yet, the engineers will argue that an ESCO will not sign an ESPC
agreement without the operations and maintenance costs due to the money they receive in
the contract. They believe this portion may be where the bulk of their profit lies. Their
discussion stems from a contention they were currently having with signing Phase II of a
second TO. They refused to agree to the task order due to the possibility that a couple of
the areas designated on the task order may be outsourced. Additionally, the engineers
questioned a number of the costs involved.
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Contract Management
Each contract file contained documentation. Additionally, records illustrated the
installation's use of price negotiation, invoice reconciliation, and other contracting
documents to manage the ESPC TOs. Memorandums between the contracting and civil
engineering squadrons documented communication efforts regarding contractor actions
and contract concerns. All activities regarding the contract were recorded and filed.
There were some activities that were not recorded in the files that had been discovered
during clarification discussions. However, overall contract files were complete with
internal and external correspondence, invoices, acquisition plans, the contract and
modifications, and documentation of training qualifications.
Several memorandums indicated problems with the invoice process, but overall
there were no issues with the contract management by the civil engineer and contracting
officer team of Base D's ESPC.
Contractor Performance
Although the government civil engineers questioned the ESCO's performance,
there were no documents to support any complaints. Furthermore, the complaints
stemmed from arguments regarding a possible second TO. For instance, the proposal
costs of the TO were questionable in the government's opinion. Costs that had been
listed in TO#l had been doubled in TO#2. The government believed that the ESCO
should have had a learning curve and costs should have decreased. If costs increased,
these costs should not have increased to such a large proportion. After the government
engineers questioned the costs, the ESCO submitted a proposal for $3 Million over the
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original proposal and then sent a complaint to the installation's headquarters stating the
government was delaying proposal acceptance.
Base D Summary
Deregulation will not be a factor on this ESPC TO for several years. Utility
prices have been stable for over ten years. Additionally, ESPC projects are on metered
facilities. The contracting office and government engineers understood ESPCs. Lastly,
there were contractor complaints of perceived performance issues.
Base D Construct Summary Table
Deregulation
No
Utility Prices

Stable

Savings
Contract Man;sigement

Metered
Documentation

Contractor Performance

Covernment Complaints

Table 7. Base D Construct Summary Table

AFCESA: Utility Prices and Deregulation
As stated previously, clarification issues that could not be answered at individual
installations were resolved at headquarters AFCESA. The team in the utility litigation
section of AFCESA studies the utility industry: restructuring initiatives, utility prices,
rate trends. Additionally, this team, along with other agencies, maintains contact with
utility providers, legislators, military installations, public utility commissions, and other
agencies to discuss utility issues and to advocate for the Air Force benefit as required.
Consequently, the case analysis included clarification discussion with this team to resolve
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any questions regarding deregulation or utility pricing in the states of the installations that
were evaluated.
Deregulation
AFCESA believes that the success of electric deregulation has not been fully
realized. The state of Texas has its own grid, excess generation, supply was greater than
demand, state backing, but it is not working - rates are not decreasing. This is the state in
which AFCESA thought deregulation would succeed. Deregulation lowered rates in the
New England states but only by 1.2 percent. AFCESA projects that perhaps when
California discovers a way to get deregulation to succeed - April 2002 at the earliest and all of the California contract issues are resolved, then and only then will deregulation
work. Yet, AFCESA predicts that the country is three to five years away from seeing
deregulation as a success and seeing lowered utility rates in California. Once that
happens, then the rest of the states will follow. The only exception is Texas which has
always been its own island. The competitive generation problem needs to be resolved.
On the other hand, gas deregulation helped consumers. Since 1986, the Air Force
has saved $6 to 8 Million each year in gas costs from well and transport to any location in
the country. Eventually electricity may help consumers also. Things like the regional
transmission system will help. The failure of Texas is what confounds AFCESA's utility
estimators due to the balanced system of supply and demand; competition should have
worked.
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Utility Prices and Trends
Although real time pricing will still be working in some areas in the country, real
time pricing (RTP) will not be optional in California. California rates are still going to go
higher, but the state is going to devise an alternative to RTP. Additionally, local utility
companies like the one servicing Base B may have considered instituting a flat rate
billing structure for several reasons. If the company uses time of use, variable, rates, then
they have to take more time metering, more time administering changes, and more time
monitoring equipment. Yet, with a flat rate billing structure, there is less metering and
administration. This may be best for a company that has adequate generation.
The Air Force predicts utility rates by taking OMB Budget numbers from the
Defense Energy and Support Center futures and securities market at Fort Belvoir. They
compare these numbers to the Department of Energy's long-range forecasts for all
utilities. Taking into account all variables, such as weather changes and OPEC
agreements, when making projections, AFCESA believes that Base D's local utility
provider will receive all of the rate increases requested including the 4.5 percent affecting
Base D.
BaseE
Base E is located in Region 6. Base E actually has four energy contracts, three
with savings payback to the government, but only two of these contracts are ESPCs.
Those two ESPCs are formal TOs under the Regional 6 main contract. It is interesting to
note that the contract that is not a savings contract is a common energy conservation
effort found at the other bases, Energy Monitoring Control System (EMCS). Although

this EMCS contract is not a savings contract, it was able to establish to operate and
maintain the system for $377,519 for a base plus lour option years. The other non-ESPC
contract had a savings for the government. This contract was solicited and awarded by
another installation and then administered by Base E. This contract was for Retrofit
Lights in the amount of $6,026,323.04. The dollar amount appears high for a lighting
retrofit contract. However, this contract, awarded in December 1993 was originally for
$1,038,588. Modifications were added to the contract per a memorandum that was
included in the file from AFCESA:
"The intent of the SES legislation was to take advantage of technical expertise in energy
efficiency and conservation that does not exist in most federal organizations, and also take advantage of the
private financing methods authorized by the law.. .Again, the determining factor is ... rather will it save
energy, specifically electrical energy." Joe Price, 24 August 1994

Deregulation
Legislation restructured electric utility laws in this state in May 1999 (EIA, 2002).
Pilot programs began in 2001, but retail competition opened for all January 2002 (EIA,
2002). In turn, Deregulation is active in this state but has not had an effect on utility
prices.
Utility Prices
Base E is in a coal burning region, but the local utility provider uses some gas to
generate electricity. The utility rates were fluctuating due to the gas during the twelve
months prior to the case analysis visit. For example, in October 2000, the utility rate was
$3.79 per kef, but, in January 2001, it was $8.90 per kef Then it jumped back down to
$3.00 per kef June 2001.
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Savings
Base E has metering on some of its individual projects, but it is not in all areas.
So the ESCO is stipulating the savings. The base civil engineers contend that they cannot
separate the ESCO's projected savings from Base E's separate savings initiatives because
of the complications of not having individual metered buildings. Furthermore, engineers
commented that with the number of equipment problems that the ESCO has been
responsible for causing, the government is not receiving any savings from ESPC
initiatives but instead is incurring a cost.
Contract Management
Fortunately, this base performed two noteworthy actions. First, before problems
with the ESCO occurred and before signing either TO, Base E included a "SHORTFALL
CLAUSE" in its TOs:
PAYMENT OF SAVINGS SHORTFALL
As authorized by clause H-17 of the basic contract, the Government shall recover any savings
shortfall in the form of a lump -sum refund payment directly from the Contractor. The Contractor shall
remit to the Government an amount equal to the savings shortfall (if any) within thirty (30) days of
completion and acceptance of the annual verification of savings. In no event shall the Government recover,
in whole or in part, such savings shortfall by reducing the fixed monthly payments owing under Exhibit C
or assert a right of setoff or counterclaim against its obligation to make full and timely payments under
Exhibit C.

This clause does two things. First, it treats the contractor shortfall of savings not as a
temporary payment to the Government, a payment which only delays future contractor
payments. It specifically labels the savings shortfall as a refund ensuring that the ESCO
is fully aware that the total value of its contract has not been delayed due to a failure to
achieve savings; instead the total value of the contract has been decreased and reimbursed
to the government. Secondly, by recovering the shortfall in the form of one lump-sum
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payment rather than applying the shortfall to future payments, the government has control
over the fund disbursement - as long as annual reconciliations are performed well before
fiscal year end.
Additionally, Base E was impressive in the manner in which it handles its
problem with its ESCO and sought assistance. The solutions had yet to be discovered
during the case analysis visit. However, contract files illustrated constant requests to
outside agencies such as AFCESA requesting assistance in reviewing TOs and advising
with ESCO problems.
Contractor Performance
Examples of equipment and performance problems can be found in the numerous
memorandums in the contract files. The government civil engineers would explain to the
contracting officer that the ESCO was procuring 15 horsepower pumps rather than the 20
horsepower pumps promised in the material submittals. After being notified of the error,
the ESCO would comment that the 15 hp motors are appropriately sized but will be
replaced to alleviate any concerns. In January 2000, the ESCO begins sending e-mails to
the contracting officer informing her that these concerns that were delaying acceptance
were creating Interest During Construction (IDC) expense. On 10 March 2000, the
ESCO stated that the government would delay the contractor an additional 35 days,
because of its failure to approve the pipe routing plan. On 25 April 2000, the ESCO
stated that the government has now delayed the contractor a full 35 days for its failure to
approve the ESCO's pipe routing plan; therefore, the ESCO threatened monetary charges
will be claimed. It was later discovered that the pipe routing plan was the most expensive
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direction to undertake, and the government engineers submitted a design for the ESCO
that proved to be less expensive for Base E. On 26 May 2000, the ESCO stated that
although the government has approved a pipe route, the total delay was over 40 working
days. In turn, the ESCO stated that its construction schedule had been impacted and it
needed a schedule delay until 20 November 2000. Yet, by 31 July 2000, it was the
government who began finding several other discrepancies in the ESCOs other ECPs.
These included incorrectly installed equipment (check valves installed backward and
upside down and piping installed incorrectly). These problems continued to occur well
past September as the ESCO stated that slow downs would incur exponential interest for
the government. Yet, significant problems failed to be corrected:
"(ESCO rep), as part of our reporting procedure this note is to inform you that last Weds night the
Thermal Energy Tank failed to recharge. This is a significant failure. We believe this to be a design flaw
that may impact anticipated energy savings if not corrected."

This problem failed again the next night and became a reoccurring problem. It was
discovered that the ESCO might have been making changes to the system without
notifying the workers in the plant. On one of the problem days, the civil engineers
forecasted major energy savings losses due to the energy demand record. They stated,
"(Base E) expects to set a new energy demand record today if the (ESCO's) pumps installed are
not fixed/replaced. If so, ALL energy savings for the year will be lost. Note that CE informed the
contractor several times in the past week about the pump problems. On 15 May 01, the COR approved
material submittals to have two (2) new pumps installed..."

TO#l (Y0001) is for Military Family Housing Radio Frequency (RF) Controllers
in the amount of $446,474 for a payback period of 15 years. The original Phase II report
was submitted for this energy conservation measure (ECM) effort August 1999, and the
second revision was submitted April 17, 2000. Base E took a significant amount of time
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accepting its phase II report. However, it involved more than one ECM. Construction
was scheduled to start and end in January 2001, but as of October 2001, the construction
had not been accepted and payments had not been made. The engineers began reviewing
the documents and discovered that the utility baseline was unknown and questioned how
the ESCO would be guaranteeing savings to the government. However, this was not the
reason for acceptance delay; the engineers began questioning equipment quality after
discovering equipment failures in other areas.
TO #2 (Y0002) is for a Thermal Energy Storage System and a Variable Volume
Chilled Water Pumping System. This TO totals $2,873,529.02 and makes 206 contractor
payments. The first payment began in July 2001, but in September, the government civil
engineers determined that the payments needed to stop. The government engineer in
charge of the project explained that the ESCO is required to submit a quarterly report in
addition to the annual report. This report gives the government an updated status of the
quarterly and cumulative savings. Because this requirement has not been filled, he
believes the contractor should not be paid. Furthermore, he believes that the utility
baseline is also questionable on this TO. Because of these contentions, communications
have degraded, and there were two outstanding claims against Base E from the ESCO
during the case analysis visit.
Base E Summary
The electric utility industry has been deregulated, and utility prices have been
fluctuating but not as a result of this restructuring initiative. Engineers state that the issue
of savings may be clouded by more than contractor stipulation. The failure of equipment
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and poor quality parts may be costing the government money instead of reducing utility
bills. Contract management is not a concern. Base civil engineers and contracting
personnel have asked for assistance, but teamwork between the two squadrons is evident,
and documentation of contractor irregularities is maintained. Contractor performance is
perceived by both contracting and civil engineers to be questionable.
Base E Construct Summary Table
Deregulation

Yes

Utility Prices

Fluctuating

Savings

Stipulated

( onlmet Management

Documentation

Contractor Performance

Government Complaints

Table 8. Base E Construct Summary Table

Cross-Case Analysis
Pattern-matching illustrates a link between the constructs of deregulation and
utility prices. In areas where there is no deregulation, utility prices appear stable. Utility
prices are volatile or fluctuating in locations where deregulation has been legislated.
However, Base E's utility prices were fluctuating as a direct result of the natural gas
prices; many of the electric plants are natural gas fired. In turn, there may or may not be
a link between deregulation and utility prices. However, the cross-case analysis should
illustrate that there is a pattern of stipulated savings and of government complaints of
contractor performance. Overall, contractors are stipulating the guaranteed savings to the
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government. Furthermore, the government perceives a problem with contractor
performance (reference Table 9).

Base A

No

Utility
Prices
Stable

Base B

Yes

Fluctuating

Base

Deregulation

Savings

Contract Mgmt

Contractor
PlTlMI'lllillHT

Stipulated
By
Contractor

No
Documentation

Gov't
Complaints

Stipulated
By
Contractor

No

No
Complaints
noted

Documentation

BaseC

Yes

Volatile

Stipulated
By
Contractor

Documentation

Gov't
Complaints

Base D

No

Stable

Metered

Documentation

(io\"t
Complaints

Base E

Yes

Fluctuating

Stipulated
By
Contractor

Documentation

Gov't
Complaints

Overall

Mixed

Fluctuating

Stipulated
By
Contractor

Mixed Results

(io\"t
Complaints

Table 9. Cross Case Analysis Pattern Matching Table

Cross-Case Analysis - Construct Summary
Deregulation
Deregulation of electric utilities was in effect at three of the five bases studied in
this thesis. In deregulated environments, utility prices have a greater potential to increase
initially; Base D is the exception. However, despite the potential increase in utility prices
from deregulation, deregulation has minimal affect on ESPCs at this time. At Base A, it
was discovered that deregulation might not have an effect for the next three years due to
legislation delaying a vote on the issue until 2004. In Base B, it was found that

deregulation might have eventually become an issue if the utility provider had changed
from a variable rate billing structure to a flat rate service. However, this was not the case.
At Base C, deregulation caused volatile utility prices in the state. One of the
Deregulation was studied in cases that were in states affected by electricity deregulation
and in states without electric deregulation initiatives. In both environments, deregulation
was shown to have a potential to increase prices when it was in effect or if it ever came
into effect except in the case of Base D. However, despite these potential increases in
prices that deregulation may have caused, deregulation has minimal affect on ESPCs at
this time. At Base A, it was discovered that deregulation might not have an effect fo r the
next three years due to legislation delaying a vote on the issue until 2004. In Base B, it
was found that deregulation might have finally become an issue if the utility provider had
changed from a variable rate billing structure to a flat rate service. However, this was not
the case. At Base C, deregulation caused volatile utility prices in the state. One of the
TOs has a set base rate, and the other TO has a rate that is not set. In turn, deregulation
could possibly be studied to determine the effect on ESPC. At Base D, deregulation may
not have an impact for another ten years. At Base E, deregulation has been implemented
in the state, but the restructuring initiative does not have a direct impact on the payback
of ESPCs. If deregulation or any factor affected ESPCs, Base E does not permit
contractor payment extensions due to the Shortfall Clause. Overall, just as the bases have
mixed results of deregulation status; those states that have been deregulated have been
affected differently by the legislation. Furthermore, although Base C, Base B, and Base
E have fluctuating or volatile utility prices, the issue of stipulated savings, addressed
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later, creates a barrier from studying that effect. In order to study the effect of
deregulation on savings, savings must first be assessed.
Utility Prices
Over the past year, utility prices at the bases studied have ranged from stable to
volatile. In some areas, utility prices have been stable and unchanged for over ten years.
In other areas, utility prices have reported seasonal price spikes and gradual price
increases. In other areas, utility prices have been volatile and have created national
attention. Whether these utility prices affect the guaranteed savings of ESPCs cannot be
assessed due to the type of measurement and verification that is performed to report the
annual government savings.
Base A experienced low and constant utility prices. This is in contrast to the
fluctuating utility prices of Base B or the volatile utility prices of Base C. Yet, Base D
has had constant, stable utility prices for over 10 years. Base E's electric utility prices
fluctuated due to the price spikes in natural gas, which fueled some of the electric
generation plants. As seen in the deregulation construct, no pattern can be seen across
these bases. There are mixed results in the trends of utility prices.
Savings
The contractor stipulates the annual government savings at four of the five
installations. Often, the energy conservation effort is performed at a facility without an
individual meter. In turn, the savings cannot be individually assessed. The contractor
stipulates in a quarterly, then an annual report, how much savings the energy
conservation effort has saved the government. The contractor is able to stipulate these
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savings by measuring the equipment in place to ensure it is functioning or verifying that
the conservation measure has been completed. Yet, this stipulation does not ensure that
the utility bill reductions result from the energy conservation measure itself. Only
metering devices have been able to meet this objective at this time as found at Base D.
Base A had a possible overlap of savings between two energy measures. Yet, this
overlap was difficult to assess due to the issue of stipulated savings. Base B stipulates its
savings and has delayed contractor payment for over six months to ensure effective
equipment monitoring devices were in place. Base C stipulates it savings and has
concerns regarding the second annual reconciliation of the first TO. Base D meters its
savings but believes that the government may not achieve the true savings guarantees due
to the "hidden" cost of maintenance and operation costs. Base E stipulates its savings but
believes that there could be no savings fo r the government due to equipment problems,
failures, and delays. Across each case, a pattern can be seen matching savings concerns
to ESPC management. The cross-case comparison illustrates that installations question
the concept of stipulated savings. Furthermore, stipulated savings impacts the
government's ability to assess the guaranteed savings loss that results from poor
contractor- installed equipment or performance.
Contract Management
In two installations, ESPCs were not treated as contract files. Items such as Price
Negotiation Memorandums, Site Visit Reports, Memorandums for Record, etc. were
absent. The ESPCs were considered such unique contracting instruments that
management over these entities appeared confused. The contract management at Base C
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on the other hand, appeared the textbook example of contracting and engineer
management excellence. Here, the Contracting officer and civil engineers worked as a
team to manage the ESPC like a construction-service hybrid contract using standard
Federal Acquisition Regulation techniques. As a result, contract paperwork was
apparent, internal and external communication was documented, and contractor conduct
was managed.
Base A mislabeled the ESPCs confusing these contracts with utility privatization
In fact, the contract administrator was sent to a utility privatization class and was never
given ESPC training. Base B understood ESPCs but used a different filing technique
than normal contract procedure. Additionally, Base B treated these contracts as
contracting instruments that did not require site visit reports or pricing memorandums.
Base C exhibited ESPCs in such a way that their filing method was sent to AFCESA as
an example. Additionally, the correspondence between squadrons and the contractor was
documented. Base D also understood ESPCs and filed these contracts using standard
contracting procedures as recommended by AFCESA and as seen in Base C. Base E
understood ESPCs but needed clarification on some issues. This clarification was self
discovered and sought by the contracting office and civil engineering team. Overall,
Base C was a textbook example, but the other installations could benefit from additional
training. In some installations, however, that additional training was required to illustrate
filing methods and to standardize ESPC with other contracting instruments. A cross-case
comparison in this construct shows only mixed results.
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Contractor Performance
Only Base B had no complaints of contractor performance. Yet, this may be due
to the fact that Base B partnered with the ESPC contractor shortly after defaulting their
HVAC contractor. All other bases had some complaints of contractor problems which
many of the government civil engineers believed to be beyond questions of poor
performance but a question of purposeful misconduct.
For example, Base A's TO has not begun construction. Yet, the ESCO used its
employee's influence to affect contract operations. The ESCO introduced the employee
over e-mail as the general officer familiar with the installation and as an acquaintance of
the installation commander. The ESCO used this influence to schedule meetings, to
shape the project's timeline, and to influence project scope although that is not the
responsibility of an operational contractor. Base C and Base D had minimal complaints
of contractor performance amounting to disagreements in reports or perceived problems
in quality. However, it was Base E that had documents illustrating a history of contractor
negligence and failure to provide contractual promises. As noted in the analysis, material
submittals would promise 20 hp engines. The contractor would install 15 hp engines.
The government engineers would experience difficulties or would inspect and perceive a
problem with the lesser quality. These issues, along with others such as parts installed
upside down or improperly, would cause the government engineers to inspect the energy
conservation measures. During these inspections, the ESCO would threaten to charge
interest for construction delays. Overall, a cross-case match of problems cannot be
discovered in regards to contractor issues. However, a pattern of government complaints
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of contractor performance problems can be found. At each installation, except Base B,
specific statements were made regarding the contractor's performance and not just the
performance itself. Consequently, the pattern match suggests that the perception of poor
contractor performance, if not the reality, exists.
Summary
Overall, there seems to be a consistent issue with stipulated savings and how
savings are tied to measurement and verification. Additionally, there were a couple of
offices that needed AFCESA assistance in ESPC training and/or techniques. That
training could include the contracting officer's right to treat the ESCO as a standard
contractor limited in its ability to control the contract environment. Contracting officers
were unaware of their right to penalize or to terminate these types of task orders due to
their link to regional contracts and the political push to implement their use.
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V. Discussion

Introduction
The primary purpose of this thesis effort was to discover the possible effects of
the deregulation of the energy industry on the savings of ESPCs. Through in-depth case
study analysis and cross-case comparison, it was discovered that deregulation had a
minimal effect on the savings of ESPCs. The effect of deregulation can be countered by
actions such as the "Shortfall Clause." This clause would allow factors, such as
deregulation, that retard savings and affect the payback, to credit the government in one
lump sum rather than extending payments that violates legislative contract term limits
and incurs more interest expenses. This clause was explained in depth in Chapter Four
under Base E description. It is recommended that this clause should be encouraged as
long as annual reconciliation and contractor payment could be accomplished well before
the end of the fiscal year cycle. This recommendation offers a solution to savings
shortfalls caused by deregulation or other unexpected events.
Although deregulation remained the focus of this thesis effort, several factors
illustrated influence over the management of ESPCs. Four of the five bases studied had
savings that were guaranteed by contract but stipulated by contractor. This factor
affected the base civil engineers' ability to effectively measure and verify government
guaranteed savings and hence efficiently manage ESPCs. Two of the five bases
experienced problems with basic contract filing techniques due to confusion with the
nature of these contracting instruments. Those installations believed these documents
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were exempt from standard contracting procedures. In turn, these bases ineffectively
managed ESPCs due to their failure to understand these contracts. Furthermore, all
installations except Base B experienced difficulties with contractor performance. These
installations discovered faulty equipment or missing parts, errors in reports, and delayed
schedules. Accurate measurement and verification and effective management is key in
an environment where quality is questionable. Consequently, the management of ESPCs
is a balance between savings verification, contractor performance, and contract
management. If contractor performance exhibits quality results, savings verification
should not be as critical. If stipulated savings must be critically reviewed and evaluated,
resourceful contract management communication, documentation, and follow-up
activities including contractor penalties. In sum, each case has exhibited a failure in at
least one of these areas: contractor performance, contract management, or savings
verification.
Recommendation
The cross case comparison illustrates that there may be several areas of concern
surrounding ESPC savings. The external utility environment is experiencing a period of
uncertain utility prices. The local base contracting and civil engineering staff complains
of measurement and verification confusion and contractor performance problems. Before
each base implemented task orders at its individual installation, scenario-based planning,
described by Courtney et al in "Strategy Under Uncertainty," should have been employed
by the agency responsible for supervising these contracting instruments (Courtney,
1997:82). With scenario-based planning, the individual ways to handle various issues
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could be bundled together to control the residual uncertainties. Stipulated savings makes
measurement and verification difficult to link the ESPC energy conservation measure to
the reduced utility bill. Volatile utility prices, such as the prices in the locality of Base C,
not only raise prices but also lower utility bills possibly creating a shortfall of savings.
Ineffective contract training will allow an installation to believe that ESPCs are just
another utility privatization effort, and these contracts may not be treated like in-house
contract documents. At present, Base C has textbook contract management. Base D uses
ESPC efforts only at metered facilities to help ensure guaranteed savings. Base E writes
a Shortfall Clause into its contracts preventing any extension or confusion in contractor
payments. If scenario-based planning had been employed, it is possible that the
controlling organization could have recognized the residual uncertainties. In turn, each
installation could have implemented the individual techniques as a consolidated unit. In
other words, rather than only Base D using metered facilities and Base E using the
Shortfall Clause, all bases would know to install meters at facilities using ESPC measures
or implement ESPC measures only at individually metered facilities. Each installation
would have a shortfall clause. Each installation would have contract files that mirrored
standard Federal Acquisition Regulation contract files.
As a contracting professional, each Contracting Officer is the designated business
manager of an installation as each acquisition reform initiative is adopted. Each
professional must consider every new acquisition or contract as a new business enterprise
to which the installation may possibly commit. In turn, scenario-based planning, or in-
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depth what-if analysis, should be undertaken before each endeavor into a new venture.
This may prevent a reoccurrence of the problems found in this study.
Scenario-Based Planning
Scenario-based planning can be used in future specialty contracting arrangements
in addition to the ESPCs researched. The AFCESA utility litigation team exhibits
legislative shaping. However, individual installations implemented various strategies
when contracting ESPCs. Base A did not use a strategy at all when implementing
ESPCs. Base B chose to adapt and use ESPCs as contract vehicles to obtain
improvements on base despite the short term or long term costs or risks. Base C adapted
to the ESPC regulations also. Base E demonstrated an attempt to shape the contract
environment with its Shortfall Clause. Base D chose not to shape but rather to adapt to
an uncertain environment by using the ESPC only on metered buildings. Actions such as
these and others are good examples, but they are just individual pieces - not enough to
create a shaping strategy. Overall, these installations used adapting strategies. As a
whole, under the direction of an agency such as AFCESA, more effective shaping
strategies could be seen at individual bases.
Future Research Efforts
Energy Savings Performance Contracts are diverse contract instruments open to a
variety of research topics. Uncovered during the case studies was a strong need for ESPC
contract management training. AFCESA has offered and conducted many training
sessions and has discovered that the training is not being attended, understood, or
implemented. Other than administering the contracts themselves, AFCESA may be open
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to a research effort to study possible training approaches or a research effort to determine
the barriers to implementing the knowledge learned during these courses. Additionally,
the case analyses also revealed that at a few of the bases, the engineers might not be truly
trained on how to evaluate the ESCO's proposal. It may be a worthwhile research effort
to determine the necessity of training the engineering personnel on inspecting and
evaluating the ESCO's proposal, i.e. whether personnel need a course in evaluation
beyond the basic ESPC training course. Furthermore, research may be conducted into the
performance of the measurement and verification system itself. This research would
need to be conducted by a researcher with an engineering background with familiarity in
utility, electrical, and environmental systems.
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